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AMERICAN HEGEMO AND THE Fo IGN 
AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION 
Robert .... ow lest 
ABSTRACT: This Article uses insights from international relations theory 
to challenge the received wisdom that U.S. courts are incompetent to decide 
.foreign affairs issues. Since September 11, 2001, in particular, proponents 
of broad executive power have argued that the Judiciary lacks the 
Executive's expertise, speed, flexibility, uniformity, and political savvy 
necessary in foreign affairs. For these reasons, legal doctrine has long 
called for especially strong foreign affairs deference to the Executive. 
This Article argues that special deference is grounded in an outmoded 
version of the popular theory of international relations known as realism. 
Realism views the world as anarchic, nations as opaque to the outside 
world, and geopolitics as though a few great powers manage the 
international system through realpolitik and the balance of power. When 
incorporated into constitutional.foreign affairs law, these realist tenets lead 
to a model that prioritizes executive branch competences over_judicial ones, 
but offers little guidance on how to weigh _foreign affairs effectiveness 
against other constitutional values such as liberty and accountability. 
The Author proposes a new, uhegemonic" model of desired institutional 
competences in foreign affairs law that takes account of the transformed 
post-Cold War world. America dominates the globe militarily, has a 
political system accessible to outsiders, provides public goods for the 
world, and plays a major role in defining enforceable international law. 
This American-led order will persist.for some time despite threats posed by 
terrorism and the rise of powers such as China and Russia. Under the 
hegemonic model, courts serve America 's .foreign affairs interests by 
maintaining stable interpretation of the law and bestowing legitimacy on 
acts of the political branches. Special deference is now unwarranted. This 
Article concludes by explaining why Bo1Jmediene v. Bush and other recent 
enemy combatant cases are consistent with the hegemonic model. 
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INTRODUCTION 
' 
How should the balance of power in the world affect the separation of 
powers under the U.S. Constitution? The conventional approaches to this 
question rely on an outmoded view of geopolitics. This Article offers a new 
model for assessing the courts' appropriate role in foreign affairs. 
American courts treat foreign affairs issues as unique and requiring very 
strong, sometimes absolute, deference to the Executive.1 These "special 
deference" doctrines are a swamp of under-justification and inconsistent 
application.2 But when courts and scholars do seek to justify special 
deference in foreign affairs, they usually resort to received wisdom about 
superior executive branch competence attributes such as speed, flexibility, 
secrecy, and uniformity contrasted with judicial incompetence.3 In the 
1. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 22 (2d ed. 
1996) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]; Curtis Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign 
Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649, 663 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley. Chevron] (surveying the deference 
doctrines). The courts give executive branch interpretations of treaties "great weight" See 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006) (quoting Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 
187, 194 ( 1961) ). Scholars have concluded that in practice this translates into a very high level 
of deference. See David Bedennan, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political 
Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1439, 1468-69 (1999) (''When it comes to treaty construction, 
courts are likely to continue masking an almost abdicationist stance in judicial review as merely 
gracious deference to executive branch interpretation.''); Scott Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty 
Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REv. 777, 789 (2008) (describing contemporary treaty interpretation 
as involving ·'near-total deference''). But see Martin S. Flaherty, Globalization and Executive 
Power (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5-20, on file with author) [hereinafter Flaherty, 
Globalization] (concluding that courts invoke "great weight'; deference but reach the same 
conclusions as they would using other tools of statutory interpretation) .. Courts also abstain far 
more often from deciding foreign relations cases under the political question doctrine. See 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW 
APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 19-20 (1992); PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES,_ JR., FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 444 (4th ed. 1998) (''Though successful 
resort to the political question doctrine in purely domestic disputes is rare, the doctrine appears 
to have greater vitality in foreign affairs."); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness ofForeign Affairs, 89 
IOWA L. REv. 941, 943 (2004) (concluding that "'reports of the doctrine's demise in foreign 
affairs are greatly exaggerated"). 
2. See Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 663 ("In most of its deference decisions, the 
Supreme Court has simply assumed, or has asserted in a conclusory fashion, that foreign affairs 
should in fact make a difference."); Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The 
Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1723, 1733 (2007) 
("There is no question that a deference doctrine of some kind currently exists with respect to 
executive-branch treaty interpretations. But the precise nature of that doctrine, its triggering 
conditions, and the obligations it imposes on judges are far from clear."); Nzelibe, supra note 1, 
at 943 (concluding that the judicial application of the political question doctrine in foreign 
affairs is ••replete with so many inconsistencies that its basic contours remain ill-defined and 
incoherent"). 
3. See, e.g., Miami Nation of Indians v. U.S. Dep't ofthe Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 347 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.) (explaining that the rationale for labeling certain issues as not amenable 
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years since 9/11, in particular, these pragmatic arguments have been the 
weapon of choice for defenders of special deference.4 The courts are, 
apparently, bringing a knife to a gunfight.5 
Why do foreign affairs demand that the executive branch enjoy vast 
discretion? The courts' view of their own competence has been shaped by 
America's role in the world. There is a deep, if usually unarticulated, 
connection between the assumed need for special deference and a popular 
theory of international relations known as realism. Realism depicts an 
anarchic international realm, populated only by nation-states, and 
dominated by roughly co-equal great powers carefully balancing one 
another.6 Executive competences are required to handle this dangerous and 
unstable external environment.7 
This classic realist model of comparative institutional competence 
seemed appropriate when America was one of several, or even two, great 
powers. But even then, importing international relations ("IR") realism into 
constitutional foreign affairs doctrine was a recipe for chaos. Realpolitik 
teaches that the state must do whatever is necessary to protect itself. 8 But 
how can courts successfully balance this overriding principle against other 
constitutional values such as the protection of liberty? 
Moreover, the post-Cold War world has provoked a crisis in realism.9 
The United States is a global hegemon. It is unrivaled in its ability to deploy 
force throughout the globe, and it provides "public goods" for the world-
such as the protection of sea lanes in exchange for broad acceptance of 
to judicial resolution is "based on the extreme sensitivity of the conduct of foreign affairs, 
judicial ignorance of those affairs, and the long tradition of regarding their conduct as an 
executive prerogative because it depends on speed, secrecy, freedom from the constraint of 
rules and the unjudicial mindset that goes by the name Realpoliti/C'); Julian Ku & John Yoo, 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive 
Branch, 23 CONST. COMM. 179, 200-01 (2006) [hereinafter Ku & Yoo, Hamdan]; .Eric A. 
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1202 
(2007). 
4. See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 200-01; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 
3, at 1202-07. 
5. See, e.g., INDIANA JONES AND THE KINGDOM OF THE CRYSTAL SKULL (Lucasfilm 2008) 
(Indiana Jones: "I think you just brought a knife to a gunfight"). Indy is referencing a scene 
from the first installment in the series, RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK (Paramount 1982), in which 
he used his gun to effortlessly dispatch a tough-looking goon impressively wielding a sword. 
6. See G. John Ikenberry, Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American 
Unipolar Age, 30 REV. OF INT'L STUD. 609, 612 (2004) [hereinafter Ikenberry, Liberalism]. 
7. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 977-78 (arguing from a realist perspective that the 
anarchic nature of the international system requires special deference because the Executive 
Branch is more competent than the courts to conduct foreign policy in this environment). 
8. For a discussion of realism and realpolitik, see infra Part II. A. 
9. Campbell Craig, American Realism Versus American Imperialism, 51 WORLD POL. 
143, 144 (2004). 
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U.S. leadership. 10 Although realism predicts counter-balancing, no great 
power or coalition has yet emerged to challenge America's predominance. 
And despite a new round of predictions about American decline, the U.S. is 
still projected to have by far the largest economy and the largest military for 
decades. 11 Political scientists have struggled to define this American-led 
system, but courts and scholars of constitutional law have largely ignored 
it.12 Instead, most debates about special deference have simply accepted 
outmoded classic realist assumptions that became conventional wisdom in 
the 1930s and 40s. 
This Article offers a new model for assessing appropriate judicial 
deference in foreign affairs that takes account of American-led order. By 
maintaining consistent interpretation of U.S. and international law over time 
and providing virtual representation for other nations and non-citizens, U.S. 
courts bestow legitimacy on the acts of the political branches, provide 
public goods for the world, and increase America's soft power all of 
which assist in maintaining the stability and legitimacy of the American-led 
hegemonic order. 
This "hegemonic" model substantially eliminates the problematic 
deference gap between foreign and domestic cases and enables courts to 
appropriately balance foreign affairs needs against other separation-of-
powers goals by "domesticating" foreign affairs deference. The hegemonic 
model also has explanatory and predictive value. In four recent cases 
addressing habeas claims by alleged enemy combatants, the Supreme Court 
rejected special deference!3 It refused to defer to the executive branch 
10. MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE 
WORLD'S GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7-9, 31-139 (2006) (describing 
numerous international public goods provided exclusively or primarily by the United States); 
Ikenberry, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 609 ("The United States is not just a superpower 
pursuing its interests; it is a producer of world order."). 
11. See infra notes 326-334 and accompanying text. 
12. See Daniel Abebe, Great Power Politics and the Structure of Foreign Relations Law, 
CHI. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http:/ /papers. ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id= 13 31162 (arguing that the breadth of 
executive authority in foreign affairs should be considered through the lens of internal and 
external constraints, and that the hegemonic system places fewer constraints on the U.S. 
executive than in the past). Two scholars have drawn on a competing theory of international 
relations, liberalism, to argue that globalization and the tendency of democracies to fonn close 
ties may eliminate the justifications for special deference, at least in some circumstances. See 
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1980, 2000 
(1993) [hereinafter Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs]; Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the 
(Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO Sr. L.J. 649, 652 (2002); see also infra notes 99-101 
and accompanying text. 
13. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (holding that Congress's 
attempt to eliminate habeas corpus for accused non-citizen enemy combatants at Guantanamo 
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interpretations of foreign affairs statutes and international law, and even 
asserted military exigencies. The hegemonic model justifies this recent 
rejection of special deference and explains why it could augur increased 
judicial involvement in foreign affairs. 
The interpretive scope here is limited. The hegemonic model is 
functional but concerns overall governmental effectiveness in foreign 
affairs, not the appropriate allocation of power with respect to any particular 
policy. Nor do I analyze the appropriate allocation of foreign affairs powers 
between the President and Congress, although the hegemonic model has 
many implications for this relationship as well. Finally, I do not address 
formalist - e.g., originalist arguments for or against special deference. The 
hegemonic model provides insights that should be considered in 
conjunction with the teachings of text, structure, and history.14 
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, a background section, I 
explain functionalism's centrality to debates about the separation of powers 
in foreign affairs. I then describe the major special deference doctrines. I 
conclude by briefly recounting the Supreme Court's refusal to apply special 
deference in the enemy combatant cases. 
Part II explains the origins of the functional justifications for special 
deference. It limns the major tenets of international relations realism as it 
had been traditionally understood prior to the post-Cold War era. Realists 
describe the international realm as inherently de-centralized and unstable. 15 
Nation-states, rather than individuals or institutions, are the only viable 
units. States are identical in terms of their function like "billiard balls 
colliding"16 and the only salient difference among them is their relative 
power. 17 Great powers determine the structure of the system, and 
enforceable international law merely reflects their interests. 18 A lay version 
Bay was unconstitutional); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557 (2006) (declaring unlawful 
the military commissions established to try certain enemy combatants for war crimes); Rasul v. 
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that alien detainees at Guantanamo had a statutory 
right to invoke habeas jurisdiction); Hamdi v. Bush, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that 
citizen-detainees possessed the right to challenge their detention using habeas). 
14. I have used originalist approaches elsewhere. See Robert Knowles, The Balance of 
Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States· Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REv. 
343, 343 (2003) (examining the original understanding of the Treaty and Admissions Clauses 
and concluding that the Louisiana Treaty was unconstitutional). 
15. Robert Keohane, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics, in NEOREALISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 14-15 (1986) [hereinafter Keohane, Neorealism]. 
16. Daniel H. Nexon & Thomas Wright, What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate, 
101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 253, 256 (2007). 
17. Keohane, Neorealism, supra note 15, at 15. 
18. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L 
L. 503, 507 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, International]. 
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of realism became incorporated into constitutional foreign relations law 
largely through the landmark 1936 decision~ Curtiss-Wright. 19 This 
completed the transformation to an executive-centered understanding of the 
foreign affairs Constitution driven by America's acquisition of an empire 
and rise to great power status. 
Part III comprehensively maps the functional justifications to 
corresponding realist tenets, and explains how these realist assumptions 
create more problems than they solve~ First, this classic realist model does 
not accurately depict the actual functioning of the branches in foreign 
affairs. For example, although foreign relations is said to require that the 
United States "speak with one voice," Congress and the President often 
conflict on foreign policy,. Second, as a descriptive matter, the realist model 
encounters boundary problems because globalization will continue to blur 
the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs issues. Third, as a 
normative matter, the realist model, if accepted in full, would require total 
deference:, it tells us very little about how best to balance foreign policy 
needs against other constitutional values. 
Part IV describes the current international order and introduces the 
hegemonic model, which I construct using insights from three mainstream 
,preeminent-power theories: unipolarity, hegemony, and empire.20 The 
hegemonic model assumes that (1) the hegemon plays a major role in 
determining enforceable, international norms; (2) the system is durable and 
stable; and that (3) the stability of the system depends not only on the 
hegemon's military predominance, but also on its provision of "public 
goods" for the system as a whole and the perceived legitimacy of the order. 
The hegemonic model aligns the assessment of institutional competences 
more closely with the positive reality of the international system. It brings 
more coherenc-e to the courts' treatment of foreign affairs by largely 
"domesticating'' it. And the hegemonic model reveals additional functional 
justifications for greater judicial involvement in foreign affairs 
controversies. 
Part IV concludes 'by using the hegemonic model to explain and justify 
the results in the enemy combatant cases. In the Post-9/11 Era, the United 
States faces serious threats from transnational terrorist groups such as al-
Qaeda, rogue states, and the proliferation of WMDs, but these phenomena 
will not themselves alter the hegemonic structure of the international 
system. When they are properly viewed as problems of hegemonic 
19. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp.~ 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
20. See Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 255. 
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management rather than as some new form of realist balancing, they cannot, 
in most situations, justify special deference. 
I. FUNCTIONALISM AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFERENCE 
The judicial treatment of foreign affairs comprises an a.morphous 
constellation of special doctrines that require very strong deference to the 
executive branch.21 Pragmatic, or functional, justifications lie at the heart of 
this special deference. Courts and scholars have assessed the relative 
institutional foreign affairs competences of the President, Congress, and the 
Judiciary. The President almost always wins by virtue of superior 
flexibility, speed, accountability, political savvy, and uniformity.22 But 
largely unexamined are the reasons why foreign affairs require these prized 
competences. 
In this Part, I discuss functionalism's importance in foreign affairs 
separation-of-powers analysis and describe the major special deference 
doctrines. I then recount a recent and striking departure from special 
deference: in four landmark cases considering habeas rights of accused 
enemy combatants, the Supreme Court exercised more robust judicial 
review akin to its treatment of domestic cases. The Court seems to have 
ignored, even rejected, traditional assessments of institutional competence. 
What justifies this refusal to defer? 
A. The Prominence of Functionalism in Foreign Affairs 
The uniqueness of foreign affairs stems in part from a void in the text 
that has long bedeviled constitutional analysis in this area.23 Article II of the 
Constitution specifically allocates only a handful of foreign affairs powers 
to the President,24 but Article I fails to provide Congress with all, or even 
most, of the remaining powers necessary to conduct foreign policy.25 This 
21. See Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 663. 
22. See infra Part III for an in-depth discussion of these competences. 
23. See LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2 
(1990) (describing as a Htwilight zone~' the legal ambiguity created by a Constitution that gives 
scant attention to foreign affairs and whose framers could not have envisioned the importance 
that foreign policy would assume in our governance). 
24. The President's enumerated powers are to receive ambassadors, to act as Commander 
in Chief of the military, and to share with the Senate the power to make treaties and 
ambassadorial appointments. U.S. CaNST. art. II,§§ 2-3. 
25. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 14-15 (concluding that "a host" ofpowers 
"were clearly intended for, and have always been exercised by, the federal government, but 
where does the Constitution say it shall be so?"). 
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void is puzzling given that one clear purpose of the Constitution was to 
overcome the slow, fractured, and limp foreign policy power previously 
vested in Congress by the Articles of Confederation. 26 
With the text presenting this difficulty, opposing sides in the classic 
twentieth cen debates about the separation of powers in foreign affairs 
turned to extra-textual sources for ammunition. The debate was engaged 
most intensely on whether the President, Congress, or neither should have 
primacy.27 In general, the nature of the textual problem influenced the 
approaches to constitutional interpretation formalist or functionalist-
taken by the defenders and critics of presidential primacy. Formalism and 
functionalism are the two broad categories of methods for interpreting the 
Constitution's allocation of powers among the branches.28 Formalist 
approaches look to the Constitution's text, structure, and historical materials 
thought to reveal the meaning of the text. 29 Pure formalism is essentialist-
it seeks to understand whether a particular power is inherently executive, 
judicial, or legislative. 30 In contrast, functionalism examines whether a 
given allocation of power serves particular purposes.31 
Because Congress has many more specifically-enumerated foreign 
affairs powers than the President, a formalist would appear to be on stronger 
ground arguing for congressional primacy.32 On the other hand, a 
26. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, Ill YALE L.J. 231, 2 77 (200 1) (noting that, under the Articles of Confederation, 
Congress "'enjoyed the executive power," but was criticized from the beginning as lacking the 
"secrecy, dispatch, and consistency" required to effectively conduct foreign affairs). 
27. !d. at 238. 
28. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1734 & n.34, 
1739-42 (1996) [hereinafter Flaherty, Dangerous]; Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function 
in the National Security Constitution, CONN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http:/ /papers.ssm.com/ so 13/papers. cfm ?abstract_ id= 115 9 5 95. 
29. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, ulf Angels Were to Govern": The Need for 
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 454 (1991) 
(describing formalism as the view that "the constitutional validity of a particular branch action, 
from the perspective of separation of powers, is to be determined not by resort to functional 
balancing, but solely by the use of a definitional analysis"). There is, of course, no consensus on 
the precise boundaries between formalism and functionalism. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. 
J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 21, 21-22 (1998); Pearlstein, supra note 28. 
30. Redish & Cisar, supra note 29, at 455. 
31. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (describing functionalism as inquiring 
whether "a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating the 
functions of govemment," and concluding that "[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the 
primary objectives or the hallmarks of democratic government"); Pearlstein, supra note 28. 
32. This argument quickly encounters difficulties, however, because the powers provided 
to Congress are also inadequate to conduct foreign policy. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 
26, at 237. 
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functionalist could argue that the general purposes of foreign affairs powers 
would be frustrated by vesting them in a slow-moving and multi-member 
legislative branch rather than a unitary executive capable of moving with 
speed, vigor, and secrecy. 
In any event, proponents of executive branch dominance have triumphed 
in the courts and in practice, a victory driven largely by functional 
considerations. 33 In assessing the steady growth in presidential power in the 
twentieth century, Louis Henkin observed that although ''the powers 
explicitly vested in [the office] are few and appear modest ... the structure 
of' the federal government, the facts of national life, the realities and 
exigencies of international relations ... and the practices of diplomacy, 
have afforded Presidents unique temptations and unique opportunities to 
acquire unique and ever larger powers. ''34 Without resort to the procedure 
specified in the Treaty Clause, for example, the President has entered into 
numerous "sole-executive agreements" that were held to trump inconsistent 
,state laws.35 On the academic side, H, Jefferson Powell, among others, has 
made a strong case for presidential primacy, arguing that it best fits "the 
goals and functions of the federal government in the area of ·foreign 
affairs.36 
While functionalism was thought to favor presidential primacy, 
formalism has been used by both sides in the debate. The huge growth in 
presidential power at the expense of the other branches had, by the 1980s, 
provoked a backlash in the academy. In the wake of the Vietnam War and 
the Iran-Contra Affair~ which seemed to expos.e deep flaws in presidential 
primacy, many scholars argued 'for formalist limits on exe,cutive power.37 
33. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 26, at 238-39. 
34. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 31. For a classic study of the growth of 
presidential power and its implications, see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY ( 1973 ) .. 
35. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942) (holding that exchange of 
letters by President Roosevelt resolving claims by Soviet government trumped inconsistent state 
laws); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (similar). 
36. H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive 
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 548 (1999). Powell concludes that the 
President~s power to make foreign policy derived from ''a complex mixture of textual arguments 
. structural arguments ... [, and] on pragmatic considerations about the executive's superior 
capacity for actually carrying out the tasks of foreign policy." ld. at 54 7-48. 
37. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 3-10 (1993) (arguing that the 
Declare War Clause vested the power to make war only in Congress, and that the President's 
war powers were limited to "repel[ling] sudden attacks" and assuming tactical control, as 
Commander in Chief, of war after it was declared by Congress); HAROLD ,HONGJU KOH, THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67-72 
(1990) (arguing for essentialist limits on executive power); see also Pearlstein, supra note 28 
(discussing scholars' approaches). 
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But originalism' s rise to prominence made formalism available as a tool for 
proponents of presidential primacy as well. Looking afresh at the text, 
structure, and early practice, originalists have made innovative arguments 
for broad executive power in foreign affairs.38 And yet, other scholars, using 
similar formalist methods, have reached starkly different conclusions about 
the original understanding of executive power. 39 These sorts of originalist 
stalemates have now become fairly common in constitutional foreign affairs 
scholarship, indicating a need for functionalist reinforcement.40 
The terrible 9/11 attacks altered foreign affairs scholarship and 
magnified the importance of functionalist arguments for expansive 
executive power and limited judicial review.41 These arguments have 
generally focused on threats from terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction. Scholars such as Eric Posner, Adrian Vermeule, and Bruce 
Ackerman argue that these threats are unique in history, that formalist 
understandings of the Constitution are inadequate to meet them, and that 
they require the speed, secrecy, and unity of decision-making found only in 
the executive branch.42 John Yoo, who had in the past made a 
comprehensive case for special deference using both fortnalist and 
functionalist methods, emphasized the importance of functional 
38. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 26, at 253 (arguing that the "Vesting Clause" in 
Article II provides the President with "residual" and non-specified foreign affairs powers). 
39. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and 
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REv. 545, 548-51 (2004) (using text and history to challenge the 
thesis that the Vesting Clause is a basis for broad executive foreign affairs power). 
40. See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional 
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REv. 153, 163 (2004) [hereinafter Ku & Yoo, 
Formalism]. Professors Ku and Yoo observe that, in the "'sharp" and "bitter" debate about 
whether the Alien Tort Statute creates a cause of action, ~4ineither side has convinced the other" 
using formalist and originalist methods. /d. at 154. Professors Ku and Yoo take ua different 
approach," conducting a functionalist, "comparative institutional analysis of the role of the 
courts in foreign affairs." /d. For an example of originalist interpretations reaching conflicting 
conclusions, compare Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 
99 MICH. L. REv. 98, 99-105 (2000) (challenging the "nationalist" view of the treaty power 
articulated in Restatement (Third) as inconsistent with the original understanding) with David 
M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist 
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1079-80 (2000) (supporting the 
nationalist view of the treaty power as consistent with original understanding and historical 
practice). 
41. Pearlstein, supra note 28. 
42. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT AITACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
AN AGE OF TERRORISM 170-71 (2006); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE 
BALANCE: SECURITY .. LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 205 (2007). John Yoo has made both forrnalist 
and functionalist arguments for executive primacy. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation 
and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1305, 1305 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaty 
Interpretation] (arguing for total deference to executive interpretations of treaties). 
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considerations after 9/11.43 Similar functional justifications lie at the core of 
Bush administration arguments against judicial review of executive policies 
regarding the interrogation, detention, and trial of suspected terrorists.44 
In response to these functionalist arguments and the perceived excesses 
of U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first cen ·. ,: many scholars .have 
returned to fortnalism, arguing that the Constitution's inherent limitations 
on government power are most valuable when they are being tested in 
crises.45 But a few critics of broad executive power have sought to address 
the post-9/11 functional arguments on their own terms by returning to the 
Founders' purposes in cre.ating a government with a separation of powers: 
(1) protecting individual rights; (2) keeping the government accountable to 
the electorate; and (3) effectiveness.46 Deborah Pearlstein has identified two 
species of effectiveness-: role effectiveness and raw effectiveness.47 Role 
effectiveness means ensuring '~that the specialization and competence of the 
branches are used together in a way necessary to run an effective 
government,'' while "raw effectiveness" involves allocating power that 
achieves a good outcome as a matter ofpolic.y.48 
Effectiveness cone-ems predominate in the post-9/11 arguments for 
expansive executive power. Pearlstein points out that many of these 
arguments are based on untested assumptions about the "raw effectiveness" 
of certain executive competences in combating terrorism; using 
organization theory, she makes the case for judicial review in terrorist 
suspect detention schemes.49 Other critics of expansive executive power 
have made compelling role-effectiveness arguments for judicial review, 
emphasizing the separation-of-powers goals of protecting individual liberty 
43. See Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 186; Ku & Yoo, Formalism, supra note 40, 
at 188. 
44~ See Pearlstein, supra note 28. 
45. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S~ Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
.Lowest .Ebb, 121 HARV. L. REv. 689 (2008); Neal K. Katyal and Laurence H. Tribe, Waging 
War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Stephen I. 
Vladeck,_ The Detention Power, 22 YALEL. & POL'YREV. 153 (2004). 
46. Flaherty, Dangerous, supra note 28, at 1740, 1786 (identifying separation of powers 
goals of"balance," "accountability," and governmental "energy"); Pearlstein, supra note 28; see 
also Bruce Ackertnan, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REv. 633, 634 (2000) 
(arguing, prior to 9/11, that the separation of powers goals were the protection of fundamental 
rights, democracy, and professionalism). 
4 7. Pearlstein, supra note 28. 
48. /d. 
49. Pearlstein observes that uthere is nothing inherent in the nature of functional analysis 
that should point in one direction or another in resolving a separation-of-powers dispute, even in 
the national security context." /d. 
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and ensuring accountability. 5° However, these critics have not addressed the 
broad theory of geopolitics underlying the deferentialist arguments. 51 
B. Judicial Deference and Foreign Affairs 
While the functional arguments were classically used to advocate 
presidential primacy over Congress, they also have been used to tag the 
courts as a distant third in foreign affairs competence. Louis Henkin 
summed up courts' perceived incompetence: "Judge-made law, the courts 
must recognize, can [only] serve foreign policy . . . grossly, and 
spasmodically; their attempts to draw lines and make exceptions must be 
bound in doctrine and justified in reasoned opinions, and they cannot 
provide flexibility, completeness, and comprehensive coherence."52 The 
courts largely shared this view of their own capacities, resulting in 
exceptional deference in foreign affairs matters. This subpart describes the 
major foreign affairs deference doctrines and how they .differ from domestic 
doctrines. 
1. Domestic Deference 
Deference is a striking departure from the norm of judicial review. The 
federal courts are "vested" under the Constitution with the "Judicial Power 
of the United States,'' which encompasses the interpretation of statutes and 
common law.53 When courts defer to the executive branch's interpretation 
of the law, they cede some or all of this power. 54 
Nonetheless, deference is common, even in non-foreign affairs cases. 
Domestic deference to executive branch interpretation of statutes now 
generally falls under two frameworks, Chevron55 and Skidmore.56 Chevron 
50. See, e.g., Flaherty, Globalization, supra note 1. 
51. I discuss the scholars who have addressed geopolitical theories in Part I. B. 
52. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 140. I discuss and analyze the functional 
arguments for courts' foreign affairs incompetence in Part III. 
53. U.S. CaNST. art. Ill, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish."). 
54. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 780 ("At its core, deference is the ceding of one power in 
favor of another.~'); see also Paul Hotwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 
1061, 1073 (2008) ("Deference, then, involves a decisionmaker ("D 1 ") setting aside its own 
judgment and following the judgment of another decisionmaker ("02'') in circumstances in 
which the deferring decisionmaker, Dl, might have reached a different decision."). 
55. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,. 842-43 
(1984). 
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is the strong deference that applies when Congress delegates lawmaking 
authority to an agency and intends that regulations "carry the force of 
law."57 This intent is manifested if the regulations are the product of a full 
and fair process that included public notice and comment. 58 Under Chevron, 
if Congress has directly decided the precise question at issue, the court 
follows that interpretation; but if Congress did not address the issue and the 
statute is silent or ambiguous, the court ac-c-epts the agency 7 s interpretation 
so long as it is "reasonable. "59 Skidmore is the weaker deference that applies 
if there is no congressional intent that the regulations carry the force of 
law. 60 Skidmore deference is fluid and encompasses factors such as "the 
degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative 
expertness and ... the persuasiveness of the agency's position."6J The 
Skidmore factors play "little if any" role in Chevron's low-threshold 
reasonableness inquiry. 62 
T.hrough these domestic deference doctrines, the courts sought to 
accommodate the rise of the administrative state and the complexity of 
modern govemance.63 Functionalism lies at the heart of Chevron. Because 
Congress almost never says whether it is delegating lawmaking authority, 
some scholars describe the delegation theory as a "le:gal fiction'' or a 
judicial background principle against whic.h Congress may legislate.64 The 
Supreme Court acknowledged this difficulty in Chevron itself, and looked 
to two functional, institutional competence justifications agency expertise 
56. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The courts apply other 
deference doctrines in certain specific circumstances. For a comprehensive description of these 
doctrines and a revisionist take on the leading role of Chevron, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. and 
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference.· Supreme Court Treatment qf Agency Statutory 
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 109{}-91 (2008) (analyzing and 
categorizing the Supreme Court's deference decisions since Chevron and concluding that, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, the Court had employed a '"continuum of deference regimes'' 
in which Chevron played only ·'a modest role"). 
57. United 'States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). 
58. !d. at 226-27. 
59. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
60. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 228. 
61. ld.; see generally Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1235 (2007) (describing the- history of Skidmore 
deference, analyzing courts' application of the doctrine, and proposing a framework to clarify 
it). 
62. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 83J, 855 
' ' (2001). 
63. See-Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1220. 
64. !d.; see also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions qf Law and Policy, 38 
ADMIN. L. REv. 363 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989). 
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and political accountability, which the courts lack.65 Importantly, Chevron's 
reasonableness inquiry does not require that the agency's interpretation be 
consistent over time, so flexibility is often cited as a functional justification 
for Chevron deference as well. 66 In addition, Chevron has been justified as 
promoting uniformity, centralizing interpretation in an agency rather than a 
diffuse court system. 67 However, these functional justifications for Chevron 
assume that the agency has used full and fair process in rulemaking. 
2. Foreign Affairs Deference 
The courts generally utilize a different form of deference in foreign 
affairs cases.68 These standards are vaguer and more sweeping than Chevron 
or Skidmore. 
One form of foreign affairs deference has been recently dubbed by two 
scholars as Curtiss-Wright deference, 69 for the controversial, but highly 
influential, 1936 decision declaring the "very delicate, plenary and 
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations. "7° Curtiss-Wright 
appeared to recognize independent executive branch lawmaking power in 
foreign affairs derived from Article II. 71 This obviates the need for a theory 
of congressional delegation and calls for deference not only when the 
statute is ambiguous, but when Congress has not "clearly trumped" the 
65. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc .. , 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); 
see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1193-94. 
66. Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 673; see also Smiley v. Citibank, N.A., 517 U.S. 
735, 742 ( 1996) ("[T]he mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency 
position is not fatal since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by 
the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency."). 
67. Bradley, Chevron, supra note I, at 673; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its 
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 V AND. L. REv. 
301, 310-13 (1988) .. 
68. Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 673-74. But cf Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 
1349 (lith Cir. 2000) (applying Chevron deference to Executive Branch interpretation of an 
immigration statute and observing that "the authority of the executive branch to fill gaps is 
especially great in the context of immigration policy"). 
69. See generally Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56. 
70. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). As I discuss in 
more detail in Part II.B, Curtiss-Wright offered a number of functional justifications for 
expansive executive power and limited judicial review rooted in a realist view of international 
relations. 
71. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56, at 1099. For an originalist argument that Article II 
does not create independent presidential lawmaking power, see Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 
26, at 252-56. 
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executive branch interpretation.72 When the Court invokes this standard, the 
government almost always prevails. 73 
But in most of these cases, the courts are deferring in another way as 
well: they refuse to independently evaluate the government's asserted 
foreign affairs interests diplomatic, security, or military.74 In Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, for instance, decided in the wake of the Iran Hostage 
Crisis, the Court applied Curtiss- Wright deference, upholding a presidential 
order suspending claims in U.S. courts against Iran in fulfillment of the 
agreement releasing the hostages, despite lack of congressional 
authorization.75 The Court deferred to the executive detennination that it 
was "a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute 
between our country and another."76 
In treaty interpretation, courts give the executive branch's views "great 
weight. "77 The standard is very murky but is generally thought to be highly 
deferential. David Bederman, in surveying twenty-three Supreme Court 
treaty interpretation cases from 1953 to 1993, concluded that the Court 
"plays out a dance in Which it reaches the interpretive merits of a treaty 
case" but will "comply invariably with the executive branch"s wishes.''78 
Robert Chesney, after surveying the sixty-seven published opinions 
involving treaty interpretation in all federal courts from 1984 to 2005, 
concluded that "the executive viewpoint does prevail in most instances," 
even if lower courts are occasionally willing to reject the executive branch 
at first.79 Martin Flaherty, however, views the treaty cases differently and 
72. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56, at 1100-01; see also, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 530, 534 (1988) (ruling against judicial review of presidential revocation of 
security clearances and declaring that, '~unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, 
courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military 
and national security affairs"). 
73. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56, at 1101 (concluding that the government has 
prevailed in each of nine cases invoking the standard since Chevron). 
74. Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 661-62; Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind 
Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 445-47 (2005) 
(distinguishing between "legal deference" and "factual deference'' in national security cases). 
75. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,658 (1981). 
76. /d. at 688; see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242-43 (1984) (deferring to 
President's determination that restricting Cuba's access to hard currency was in the interests of 
the United States because the money could be used to support violence and terrorism). 
77. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 336 (2006) ('"[W]hile courts interpret 
treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly 
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight."') (quoting Kolovrat v. 
Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961 )). 
78. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
953, 1016 (1994). 
79. Chesney, supra note 2, at 1754-55. 
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argues that courts would have reached the same conclusions using other 
tools of statutory interpretation, and that the "great weight" standard is 
nothing but a "blimp."80 Nonetheless, whether "great weight" deference is 
meaningful or just a cover, it does reveal that courts view treaties as 
requiring at least the appearance of exceptional deference. 
Abstention from deciding an issue altogether, under the political question 
doctrine, is the ultimate form of deference.81 The Supreme Court articulated 
the modem doctrine in Baker v. Carr. 82 Although, like Chevron, the modem 
doctrine contains a formal component "a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department" the outcome often hinges on "prudential," or functional, 
considerations, particularly in foreign affairs cases. 83 The functional 
justifications for abstention under the political question doctrine fall into 
two categories. First, there are issues that courts are incompetent to 
evaluate because they lack "judicially manageable standards'' or would 
require "a policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion. "84 Second, courts should not decide issues that would have 
collateral consequences in the form of "embarrassment" or "lack of respect" 
to the other branches. 85 Despite its declining use in domestic cases, the 
political question doctrine still has great force in foreign affairs. 86 In fact, 
courts have added extra-Baker functional justifications for abstaining in 
foreign affairs controversies the difficulty of obtaining extraterritorial 
evidence, the high stakes involved, and the extreme sensitivity of these 
issues.87 
3. Reforming and Defending the Doctrines 
When the Judiciary has already accommodated superior executive 
competence through domestic deference, what justifies special foreign 
affairs deference? Although Chevron and Skidmore certainly have their 
critics, the foreign affairs deference doctrines have long been the subject of 
80. Flaherty, Globalization, supra note 1. 
81. See Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 559-60 (placing the political question doctrine 
on the same spectrum as other deference doctrines); Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 962 (same). 
82. 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (holding that apportionment of state legislative districts was 
justiciable and not a political question). 
83. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 948 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
84 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
85. See id. 
86. See generally supra note 1. 
87. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 952; see also FRANCK, supra note 1, at 46-58 (discussing 
cases). 
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harsh criticism and proposals for reformation. 88 Prominent foreign relations 
scholars, citing Marbury v. Madison's exhortations, view special deference 
as an abdication of judicial responsibility and call for very little deference. 89 
Seeking a middle path between non-deference and total deference, other 
scholars have sought to bring more coherence to the special deference 
doctrines by exporting domestic deference to foreign affairs.90 
Chevron has also been deployed in defense of special deference. Eric 
Posner and Cass Sunstein use Chevron's functional bases to advocate for 
super-strong Chevron deference in foreign affairs cases. Because the 
expertise rationale applies with more force in foreign affairs cases and the 
accountability rationale is at least as strong, they argue, the courts should 
defer to reasonable executive branch interpretations even when they take the 
form of litigation positions.91 In other words, this "super-strong Chevron 
deference" would have courts apply the easily-satisfied reasonableness 
standard of Chevron without the process requirements that limit its 
application in domestic cases. It is tantamount to Curtiss-Wright deference. 
There is no question that the foreign affairs deference doctrines badly 
need clarification, structure, and consistency. Many proposed reforms 
address the functional arguments, weighing the pragmatic considerations for 
88. See Chesney, supra note 2, at 1758~ 70 (describing the range of approaches advocated 
by scholars for reforming treaty deference); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 799-804 (same); Nzelibe, 
supra note 1, at 956 (describing proposals for limiting the use of the political question doctrine 
in foreign affairs). 
89. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 1, at 4-5; MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIPLOMACY 313-21 (1990); KOH, supra note 37, at 146--48; David Gray Adler, Court, 
Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 19, 19-20 (1996). Curtis Bradley has labeled this the "Marbury perspective," 
which he describes as "a choice between two extremes: either the courts in foreign affairs cases 
enforce the "rule of law' against the Executive or they abdicate their judicial function." Bradley, 
Chevron, supra note 1, at 650. 
90. See Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 726 (proposing Chevron deference as a tool 
"for understanding and limiting deference in this othetwise amorphous area" and flushing out 
instances of executive lawmaking); Chesney, supra note 2, at 1729, 1771-74 (proposing an 
integrated model "calibrating the degree of deference in a particular case with reference to 
considerations including ( 1) the nature of the process employed by the executive branch to 
generate the interpretation and (2) the subject matter of the agreement itself'); Evan Criddle, 
Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 1927, 1927-28 (2003) (arguing 
that Skidmore deference is "'a superior paradigm for conceptualizing judicial deference to 
executive treaty interpretation"); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 799-804 (describing the range of 
approaches to treaty interpretation advocated by scholars); Sullivan, supra note I, at 779, 812-
14 (assessing the institutional competences of courts and the executive to interpret treaties, and 
proposing a '"'Skidmore-style, flexible scale of deference that considers the amount of executive 
self-interest and expertise, the type of instrument, and the consistency and process of the 
executive interpretation). 
91. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1207. 
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and against particular deference standards. 92 But these proposals do not 
engage with the geopolitical theory underlying the doctrines and their 
functional justifications.93 Instead, the relative institutional foreign affairs 
competences are recited as common-sense observations, sometimes 
supported with an illustration or two.94 Yet, as with all pragmatic theories of 
interpretation, the results reached depend on the interpreter's assumptions 
about the world.95 
A handful of scholars have grounded discussion of functionalist 
arguments for deference in a theory of international relations. Jide Nzelibe 
defended the continued use of the political question doctrine in foreign 
affairs cases, using international relations realism as a starting point.96 For 
Nzelibe, the anarchic nature of the international system a core tenet of 
realism limits the ability of courts to track the meaning of foreign affairs 
law, and limits their effectiveness and legitimacy in this area.97 Similarly, 
John Y oo has argued for near-total deference to the President in treaty 
interpretation, citing the anarchic and political nature of the international 
realm.98 
Other scholars have argued that recent developments in international 
relations will undermine the rationales for special deference over time. 
These scholars draw upon insights from liberalism, a competing 
geopolitical theory that, in contrast to realism, focuses on the internal 
characteristics of states, as well as transnational ties among individuals and 
institutions.99 Peter Spiro sees the increasing non-govertrmental interaction 
among nations and their citizens, the institutionalization of international 
relations through transnational entities such as the WTO, and the mobility 
of capital as trends that will justify a decline in the use of the political 
question doctrine in foreign affairs, despite the impact of 9/11. 100 Anne-
Marie Slaughter argues that the special military-political relations among 
liberal states "undertnine the alleged difference between domestic and 
92. See. e.g., Ku and Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3; Sullivan, supra note 1. 
93. I describe the roots of these justifications in Part II. 
94. See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1202 (describing the justifications for 
special deference in foreign relations as ''often less textual than functional, based on traditional 
practices and understandings"). 
95. Cf. R. George Wright, Dependence and Hierarchy Among Constitutional Theories, 70 
BROOK. L. REv. 141, 145-61 (2004) (arguing that pragmatic theories of constitutional 
interpretation are ultimately dependent on rival theories). 
96. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 941. 
97. /d. I address these arguments in Part III. 
98. See Yoo, Treaty Interpretation, supra note 42, at 1305. 
99. See Slaughter, International, supra note 18, at 504. 
I 00. See Spiro, supra note 12, at 649-50. 
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foreign affairs" and the justifications for the political question doctrine with 
respect to those states. 101 
Yet neither of these approaches the dominant realist view and the 
alternative liberal view uses as a starting point one of the most salient 
features of the twenty-first cen · global system the predominance of the 
United States. 102 While the realists view special deference through the past 
history of great power conflict, the liberal internationalists look to the 
future, viewing the decline of special deference as a logical response to 
current trends such as globalization and the democratic peace. These 
approaches treat the United States as either one of many great powers or 
one of many liberal democracies with close ties to other liberal states. As I 
discuss in more detail in Part IV, the present international system, as a 
whole, corresponds to neither perspective. 
C. The Enemy Combatant Cases: Limited Deference 
During the years following 9/11, the Supreme Court has made a 
substantial departure from the special deference nonn in four habeas cases 
regarding the detention of "enemy combatants."103 These cases concerned a 
foreign affairs power thought to be least appropriate for judicial oversight-
the authority to wage war. 104 Rather than apply the special deference 
doctrines or abstain from deciding the cases altogether under the still-
vibrant political question doctrine in foreign affairs, the Supreme Court 
rejected the government's functional rationales for exceptional deference 
each time. 105 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld addressed the executive branch power to detain 
enemy combatants as part of the war against al Qaeda and the Tali ban, and 
101. Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 1980,2001. 
102. G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL ORDER & IMPERIAL AMBITION 147 (2006) [hereinafter 
IKENBERRY, IMPERIAL]. 
103. For the purposes of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") proceedings at 
Guantanamo, an enemy combatant is defined as "an individual who was part of or supporting 
Taliban oral Qaeda forces," including "any person who has committed a belligerent act or has 
directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." Memorandum from Paul 
Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Navy, (July 7, 2004), available 
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. (ordering the establishment 
of CSRT proceedings). However, the Supreme Court utilized a narrower definition of "enemy 
combatant" in Hamdi. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U~S. 507, 524 (2004). 
104. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294-95 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
105. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 620-24 (2006); 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-535; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487-88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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the process due U.S. citizens who dispute their enemy combatant status. 106 
The government's central argument was functional: given the courts7 
"limited institutional capabilities . . . in matters of military decisionmaking 
in conn·ection with an ongoing conflict,'' courts should eschew evaluation of 
individual cases and decide only whether the overall detention scheme was 
legally authorized.107 At most, the Court's role was to review for facial 
sufficiency a two-page declaration by a Defense Department official who 
had reviewed classified documents allegedly providing the legal and factual 
basis for an individual's detention.108 The Fourth Circuit had agreed, citing 
the expertise and accountability justifications for Curtiss-Wright deference 
and concluding that "[n]o further factual inquiry is necessary or proper."109 
The Supreme Court rejected these functional arguments. 110 The Court 
acknowledged that Congress had authorized the detention of ''enemy 
combatants" to prevent return to the battlefield, but it was the Court's role 
to independently evaluate the procedures used for a detainee's challenge to 
his enemy combatant status. 111 The plurality's approach applied a domestic, 
functional doctrine the Matthews v. Eldridge112 due process balancing 
test to weigh the detainee's liberty interest and the value of additional 
procedures against the government's interest in security and the cost of 
those additional procedures. 113 At a minimum, due process required that ''a 
citizen-detainee . . . must receive notice of the factual basis for his 
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual 
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."114 Rather than try to conform to 
these requirements, the government released Hamdi. 115 
On the same day as Hamdi, the Court issued its opinion in Rasul v~ Bush, 
holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to the alien detainees 
106. 542 U.S. at 516, 524. Hamdi was a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan and briefly 
held at Guantanamo. /d. at 510-11. 
107. !d. at 527 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 26, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696 
(March 29, 2004)). 
108. /d. at 527-535. 
109. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi Ill), 316 F.3d 450, 459, 463 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing 
superior executive expertise, experience, and accountability in warrnaking); see also Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld (Hamdi II), 296 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Curtiss-Wright and 
concluding that its "great deference" extended to the capture and detention of enem,y 
combatants). 
110. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-535. 
111. /d. 
112. 424 u.s. 319 (1976). 
113. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-535. 
114. /d. at 533. 
115. See Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-American It Had Captured in 
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A15. 
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held at Guantanamo.116 The Rasul holding hinged on interpretation of the 
habeas statute,117 but Justice Kennedy, in a concurrence, directly addressed, 
and rejected, the government's functional arguments. 118 While conceding 
that there was "a realm of political authority over military affairs where the 
judicial power may not enter," Justice Kennedy concluded that the military 
exigencies were not sufficient to deny habeas to the detainees. 119 
Guantanamo is "in every practical respect a United States territory, and ... 
is ... far removed from any hostilities.''120 And while ''detention without 
proceedings or trial would be justified by military necessity for a matter of 
weeks," after months and years "the case for continued detention to meet 
military exigencies becomes weaker."121 There was little deference to the 
government's asserted foreign policy requirements. 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 122 the Court declared unlawful the military 
commissions established in 2001 to try a handful of the Guantanamo 
detainees for war crimes. 123 Hamdan was an across-the-board refusal to 
defer to the executive branch.124 The majority concluded that the 
commissions violated the Unifortn Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") and 
the Geneva Conventions. 125 In rejecting the government's interpretations, 
the Court declined to apply any of the foreign affairs deference doctrines. 126 
The UCMJ required that military commission rules be the same as for 
courts martial "insofar as practicable," and the President's determination of 
impracticability lacked any supporting record. 127 Under Curtiss-Wright 
116. 542 u.s. 466, 467 (2004 ). 
117. /d. at 476 (distinguishing the facts of Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766, 777 
( 1950), and relying on an intervening change in the understanding for the basis of statutory 
habeas jurisdiction). 
118. /d. at 486-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
119. /d. at 487-88. 
120. !d. at 487. 
121. /d. 
122. 548 u.s. 557 (2006). 
123. /d. at 635. As of August 2008, a dozen Guantanamo detainees have been formally 
charged. Human Rights Watch, US: Hamdan Trial Exposes Flaws in Military Commissions 
(Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/06/us-hamdan-trial-exposes-flaws-
mi litary-commissions. 
124. See Eskridge and Baer, supra note 56, at 1219-21 (describing the Court's approach in 
Hamdan as ••anti-deference"). 
125. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 597-602. 
126. The Court did not explicitly apply Chevron deference either. See Ku and Yoo, 
Hamdan, supra note 3, at 179, 185-86. 
127. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620-24 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000)). See also Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000), amended by Military Commissions Act of 
2006, 10 u.s.c. § 836 (2006). 
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deference, such a record would not be required. 128 The commissions were 
unlawful because, unlike courts martial, they denied defendants the right to 
be present at trial and allowed hearsay evidence, including evidence 
obtained through coercion.129 Then, without invoking "great weight" treaty 
deference, the Court rejected the government's interpretation of Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.130 The Court held that Common 
Article 3, which covered individuals involved in armed conflicts "not of an 
international character," applied to Hamdan because this phrase meant all 
conflicts not between nation-states, including the war with al Qaeda.131 The 
military commissions, the Court concluded, violated Common Article 3 's 
requirement that defendants be tried by a "regularly constituted court. "132 
The military commissions ground to a halt. 
During 2006, a previously docile Congress finally began to address the 
legal quagmire created by the enemy combatant detention policy, passing 
two statutes purporting to strip habeas jurisdiction for Guantanamo 
detainees and replace it with a limited, direct appeal to the D.C. Circuit 
from the military's enemy combatant determination.133 Boumediene v. 
Bush, 134 a 5-4 decision declaring the habeas-stripping provision 
unconstitutional, stands out as a very rare rebuff to both the executive 
branch and Congress in foreign affairs. The Court held that the Guantanamo 
detainees had a constitutional right to habeas and that the alternative was an 
inadequate substitute because it did not provide detainees the opportunity to 
introduce new evidence to rebut the government's, nor did the alternative 
empower the D.C. Circuit to order a detainee's release. 135 
128. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 718-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Curtiss-Wright and 
noting the failure of the majority to apply special deference). 
129. See id. at 613-25 (plurality opinion). 
130. /d. at 632. 
131. See id.; see also Co-MMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: 
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 4-5 
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958). 
132. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635. A different, non-controlling plurality also concluded that 
the commissions departed from customary international law the law of aitned conflict in 
charging Hamdan with conspiracy. See id. at 677. 
133. The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 44 
(2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. 
(2006)), purported to strip habeas jurisdiction for Guantanamo detainees and replace it with 
exclusive, but limited, review of CSRT proceedings in the D.C. Circuit. The Military 
Commissions Act (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w and 
scatterd sections of 10 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2006)), inter alia, re-
established the military commissions and eliminated habeas corpus for all aliens designated as 
••enemy combatants,, or awaiting a deterntination of that status. 
134. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
135. /d. at 2250. 
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The opinions encapsulated the state of the current debates about foreign 
affairs powers. While both the majority and the dissents gave credence to 
formalist, originalist approaches136 examining the reach of habeas as it 
would have been understood at the Founding both sides ultimately turned 
to functionalism. 137 Front-and-center were fundamental disagreements about 
the most effective roles for the Executive, Congress, and the Judiciary in 
foreign affairs. 
As with the originalist stalemates in foreign affairs scholarship, Justice 
Kennedy"s majority opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent reached conflicting 
conclusions about whether the original understanding of the Great Writ's 
reach extended to aliens at Guantanamo. 138 Finding the history 
"indeterminate," the majority turned to functional considerations, looking 
beyond Guantanamo' s formal status as sovereign Cuban territory and 
making an independent assessment of the govennnent' s claimed military 
exigencies.139 Excluding habeas at Guantanamo would give the political 
branches "the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will. "140 On the 
other hand, the Court concluded, "[t]he Government presents no credible 
arguments that the military mission . . . would be compromised if habeas 
corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees' claims."141 The majority 
was careful to place limits on the reach of habeas during war and 
emphasized time as an important factor. Habeas would be available 
sometime well after capture, and only after the executive branch had made 
its own determination of the detainee's status; and extra allowances should 
be made for domestic, emergency situations.142 
Nevertheless, the Court had refused to deploy special deference to the 
executive branch's foreign policy assessments, and the dissenters were 
livid. Chief Justice Roberts lamented that the American people had lost "a 
bit more control over the conduct of this Nation's foreign policy to 
unelected, politically unaccountable judges."143 He argued that the detainees 
were actually worse off than they had been without habeas.144 Justice Scalia 
136. /d. at 2248, 2275-77; see id. at 2294-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
137. /d. at 2259 (majority opinion); id. at 2297 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
138. Compare id. at 2248-49 (majority opinion) (concluding that intent and history were 
indeterminate on this question) with id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that the -·writ 
does not, and never has, run in favor of aliens abroad"). 
139. See id. at 2259 (majority opinion). 
140. /d. 
141. Id. at 2261. 
142. /d. at 2275-77 (explaining that where it would impose 4'onerous burdens on the 
Government ... [courts] would be required to devise sensible rules for staying habeas corpus 
proceedings until the Government can comply with its requirements in a responsible way"). 
143. /d. at 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
144. /d. at 2294. 
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accused the majority of ''faux deference,'' contending that it had ~'blundered 
in" where it was incompetent to "second-guess" the political branches' 
decisions about ''how to handle enemy prisoners in this war."145 He bluntly 
declared that the decision ''will almost certainly cause more Americans to 
be killed."146 
Seemingly in response, the majority suggested that the times called 'for a 
new paradigm of role effectiveness in foreign affairs. "If, as some fear, 
terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come," the 
majority reasoned, the Court may have to define the ''outer boundaries;' of 
the war powers. 147 But the Court invited the political branches to "engage in 
a g,enuine debate'' about "how best to preserve constitutional values while 
protecting the Nation from terrorism." In the war on terror, the Court's 
institutional legitimacy would benefit the Executive, whose exercise of 
power is "vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial 
Branch. "148-
Boumediene indicates a move away from special deference in foreign 
affairs, at least in the area of the detention of enemy combatants. Although 
the Court in Boumediene cited Curtiss-Wright, it did not afford anything 
like Curtiss-Wright deference.149 In approaches to constitutional 
interpretation, foreign affairs still makes a difference functional 
considerations dominate over fonnal ones. But the post-9/11 enemy 
combatant cases are virtually unprecedented in their rejection of the 
executive's functional arguments. This could very well mark the beginning 
of a new understanding of the courts' role in foreign affairs. In the rest of 
the Article, I explain how theories of international relations support such a 
change. 
II. THE REALIST ROOTS OF SPECIAL DEFERENCE 
The special deference doctrines derive from general understandings 
about the desired institutional competences in foreign affairs. Americ,a's 
ability to function and thrive as a sovereign nation is believed to depend on 
executive branch competences because of the way the world operates. That 
understanding of the world is essentially international relations realism. 
145. /d. at 2296, 2296 n.1 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
146. Id. at 2296. 
14 7. /d. at 2277 (majority opinion). 
148. /d. 
149. /d. at 2276-77 ("In considering both the procedural and substantive standards used to 
impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the political 
branches."). 
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This section describes the key tenets of realism. It then offers an account 
of how a lay version of realism became part of judicial discourse, largely 
through the enormously influential Curtiss-Wright decision in 1936. The 
perceived exigencies of the Cold War reinforced the realist basis for special 
deference. 
A. Realism 
Realism, in one form or another, has long been a prominent paradigm of 
international relations. 15° For 2000 years, political philosophers and 
scientists from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides to the Renaissance 
Italian writer Nicolo Machiavelli to modem political scientists such as E.H. 
Carr, George F. Kennan, Henry Kissinger, and Hans J. Morganthau have 
relied on realist assumptions about the world. Their shared understanding 
was that nation states (rather than individuals or institutions) are the basic 
units of action in world affairs, that each nation seeks to maximize its own 
power, and that states behave in more or less rational ways. 151 This 
"classical realism" focused on statecraft and saw the drive for power as a 
result of fundamental human nature. 152 
A recent incarnation, called ~'neorealism" or "structural realism," was 
articulated in its most influential form by Kenneth Waltz in 1979. 153 
150. Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 1999; Jeffrey W. Legro & Andrew 
Moravcsik, Is Anybo(}y Still a Realist?, 24 INT'L SEC. 2, 5~6 (1999) (discussing the 
"degeneration" of realist theory after the end of the Cold War but observing that it '(oremains the 
primary or alternative theory in virtually every major book and article addressing general 
theories of world politics, particularly in security affairs''); Robert Keohane, Theory of World 
Politics: Structural Rf!alism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 158 (Robert 0. 
Keohane ed., 1986) (''For over 2000 years, what Hans J. Morganthau dubbed ~Political Realism' 
has constituted the principal tradition for the analysis of international relations in Europe and its 
offshoots in the New World."). 
151. Keohane, Neorea/ism, supra note 15, at 7-9,211 (discussing Machiavelli's influence 
on realism). 
152. For major works in the classical realist tradition, see, for example, E.H. CARR, THE 
TWENTY YEARS: CRISIS, 1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS (2d ed. 1964) (describing realism as opposed to '-utopianism"); HANS J. 
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER .AND PEACE (7th ed. 
2006) (setting forth a systematic account of political realism); GEORGE F. KENNAN,_ AMERICAN 
DIPLOMACY: EXPANDED EDITION (1984); HENRY KISSINGER,_ DIPLOMACY (1994); MARTIN 
WIGHT, POWER POLITICS (2d ed. 1986) (analyzing the failure of the League of Nations to affect 
international anarchy). For a recent realist argument that the optimism during the 1990s about 
enduring peace among nations w~s similarly misplaced, see JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE 
TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (200 1 ). 
153. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 79-98 (1979) [hereinafter 
WALTZ, THEORYl Waltz and other realists acknowledge that the actual interactions of nations 
will often depart significantly from these assumptions, but observe that the value of descriptive 
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Building on the work of Hans Morganthau and others, Waltz sought to 
systematize political realism by focusing on the structure of the 
international order as a way of explaining the behavior of states.154 In 
Waltz·;s theory, only three variables comprise the model: (1) the degree of 
order in the system, (2) the function of units in the system, and (3) the 
relative capabilities of those units.155 But two of these variables are fixed-
an international system is always anarchic, and all of its units, nation states, 
have identical functions. Thus the only salient difference among nations is 
the distribution ofpower.156 This parsimonious theory has been described as 
"billiard balls" colliding.157 
Although. Waltz's spare brand of realism is not universally accepted 
among realists, its tripartite model provides a useful template for describing 
realism in general and the ways in which it has influenced the courts' and 
scholars) functional justifications for special deference}58 As I discuss 
below, it is also useful for explaining why many of the justifications are no 
longer viable. It is therefore worth discussing each aspect in more detail. 
1. Anarchy 
When the realists describe the international realm as anarchic, they do 
not mean that the world is necessarily violent, but that power is 
decentralized.159 Although there are international laws and institutions, there 
is no world government with the power to enforce laws.160 The United 
Nations and the World Bank have no army or navy. Without such governing 
accuracy must be weighed against the greater explanatory and predictive pow.er of a 
parsimonious theory. Kenneth N. Waltz, Law and Theories, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 27, 
34 (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986). 
154. Kenneth N. Waltz, Political Structures, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 70, 72 
(Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986) [hereinafter Waltz, Structures]. 
155. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 153, at 97. 
156. Seeid. 
157. A. WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
19-24 (1962); Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 256. 
158. I use Waltz's framework because it has been highly influential, and because it adheres 
closely to prior versions of realism, the insights of which would likely have been perceived as 
common wisdom by many educated laypersons. Nonetheless, realism has continued to evolve, 
and many realists depart significantly from Waltz's views. For example, "offensive realists" 
part company with Waltz's structural realism because they conclude that all states seek to 
dominate rather than merely survive. See, e.g., MEARSHEIMER, supra note 152, at 20-21. For a 
discussion of the evolution of realism since 1979, see generally Legro & Moravcsik, supra note 
150. 
159. Kenneth N. Waltz, Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power, in NEOREALISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 98, 112 (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986) [hereinafter Waltz, Anarchic Orders]. 
160. See MEARSHElMER, supra note 152, at 30, 51. 
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authority, nations can never be sure if others will abide by agreements or 
international law, and they have no means of enforcing those agreements. 161 
They must engage in self-help.162 Because states' interests shift over time, 
"the world is in flux. "163 
Realists draw a sharp distinction between the anarchic international 
realm and the domestic re.alm which is characterized by order and 
hierarchy. According to Waltz, "In]ational politics is the realm of authority, 
of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of 
struggle, and of accommodation. The international realm is preeminently a 
political one,."J64 
2. Sovereign States with Identical Functions 
According to realists, sovereign states are the fundamental unit of the 
international realm. A state is sovereign in that it "decides for itself how it 
will cope with its internal and external problems."165 Each nation is 
"opaque," having a unified relationship with the rest of the world. 166 And 
nations are alike in function because they provide the same things to their 
citizens welfare, security, rule of law though they may do so in different 
ways_.167 These identically-functioning nation-states are the whole ball 
game: realist theory discounts the role of transnational institutions, ideas, 
and internal characteristics of states in determining outcomes in 
international politics. 168 
3. The Balance of Power and Realpolitik 
In an anarchic realm populated by nation-states that perfortn the same 
functions, states are distinguished from one another only by their power. 
"The units of greatest capability set the scene of action" for the rest, and so 
a "general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great 
161. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Realist Views oflnternational Law, 96 AM. Soc'v INT'L 
L. PROC. 265, 268 (2002) ("It is naive to expect that a stable international order can be erected 
on normative principles embodied in international law."). 
162. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 152, at 51; Waltz, Anarchic Orders, supra note 159, at 100. 
163. MORGENTHAU, supra note 152, -at 4-16. 
164. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 153, at 113. 
165. /d. 
166. Slaughter, International, supra note 18, at 5. 
167. Waltz, Structures, supra note 154, at 91-92. 
168. Slaughter, International, supra note 18, at 5. 
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powers."169 Neo-realists categorize the international system according to the 
number of great powers.170 A system with two great powers such as the 
Cold War system dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States is 
bipolar. A system with more great powers is multipolar. 
The result of power differentials in the world, realists predict, is a 
balance of power. The efforts of each great power to maximize its own 
capabilities will necessarily result in an equilibrium as weaker powers align 
to counterbalance stronger ones.171 The structure of the system changes 
when great powers rise or fall, usually through war. Without a central 
authority willing or able to intervene in world affairs, each state must be 
prepared to use force to survive.172 Realists have tended to prioritize issues 
surrounding the use or potential use of the military. 173 
Realists also make normative claims, which I will refer to as 
realpolitik. 114 For most realists, including Waltz, the great powers in the 
international system should seek stability and avoid major war.175 Because a 
balance of power is the arrangement least likely to lead to war, realists see it 
as a goal of foreign policy as well as a prediction about state behavior.176 
169. Kenneth N. Waltz, Reductionist, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 47, 61 (Robert 0. 
Keohane ed., 1986) [hereinafter Waltz, Reductionist]. 
170. Realists define a great power as '"'a nation that can hold its own in a war with any other 
nation." Craig, supra note 9, at 168. 
171. Some confusion surrounds the term "balance of power," which has been used in 
several different ways. It can mean, inter alia, an actual, even distribution of power, the 
nortnative principle that power should be evenly distributed, or the tendency of the international 
system to produce an even distribution of power. See generally MICHAEL SHEEHAN, THE 
BALANCE OF POWER: HISTORY AND THEORY 2-4 (2000). 
172. Slaughter, International, supra note 18, at 504; Waltz, Anarchic Orders, supra note 
159 at I 11-12. 
173. Slaughter, International, supra note 18, at 504. 
174. Realpolitik does not have a precise meaning in international relations. It was originally 
used to describe ''policies of limited objectives which had a reasonable chance of success," but 
became a broader term for the European diplomatic tradition developed during the Seventeenth 
through the Nineteenth Centuries, which emphasized the need for broad discretion in 
conducting states' external affairs and the duty of statesmen from the great powers to "maintain 
an international order in which no one state dominates the rest." MARTIN GRIFFITHS, FIFTY KEY 
THINKERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 26 (1999) [hereinafter GRIFFITHS, THINKERS] 
(discussing Henry Kissinger's theory and approach to foreign affairs and foreign policy). It is 
often associated with Henry Kissinger, who defined it as "foreign policy based on calculations 
of power and the national interest." KISSINGER, supra note 152, at 137. It is also used as a 
synonym for realism. See, e.g., John K. Setear, Room for Law: Realism, Evolutionary Biology, 
and the Promise(s) of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, I n.3 (2005). 
175. Craig, supra note 9, at 144; KISSINGER, supra note 152, at 34 (noting the "European 
concept of raison d'etat, which asserted that a state's actions can only be judged by their 
success"). 
176. Id. 
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Realpolitik requires flexibility. Because the world is anarchic and in flux, 
a nation must be willing to violate its own agreements and international law 
if necessary to advance its interests. Machiavelli wrote that the Prince may 
be obliged to "act against his promise, against charity, against humanity, 
and against religion'' and "that he have a mind ready to tum itself according 
to the way the winds of fortune and the changeability of political affairs 
require. "177 Acts that would be repugnant in a domestic context are fair 
game in the wider world.178 States must not be constrained by international 
law if it is contrary to their interests. 179 A flexible foreign policy requires 
that it be conducted by an elite group of statesmen from the great powers 
who know one another, can make decisions swiftly, operate in secret if 
necessary, and can work out among them a stable balance ofpower. 180 
B. Special Deference and Realism-Curtiss-Wright 
Realism is particularly compatible with functional methods of 
constitutional interpretation. The demands of realpolitik require ultimate 
flexibility and discretion, but formalist modes of interpretation impose 
absolute limits on the exercise of power. It was functionalism that enabled 
realism to become part of constitutional foreign affairs law. 
Although realist and functionalist conceptions of presidential power were 
expressed from the beginning especially by Alexander Hamilton181-
realist ideas did not begin to enter judicial discourse until the early 
twentieth century. The turn to realism was embodied in Curtiss-Wright, 
which rejected a challenge, on non-delegation grounds, to a joint resolution 
empowering the President to enforce a criminal prohibition on the sale of 
arms in the Unite.d States to countries engaged in a war in South America. 182 
177. NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 61 (Peter Bondanella trans., Oxford University 
Press 2005). 
178. This is the concept of raison d'etat, or "reason of the state;" part of the tradition of 
realpolitik. See supra note 175. 
179. See, e.g., Krasner, supra note 161,. at 268; see also MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF 
LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER INTERVENTIONISM .AFTER KOSOVO 84 (2001) (concluding that 
~'the use of force among states simply is no longer subject if it ever was subject to the rule of 
law"); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005) 
(''[l]ntemational law does not pull states toward compliance contrary to their interests . . and 
the distribution of state power.;,). 
180. GRIFFITHS, THINKERS, supra note 174, at 26 (explaining that Henry Kissinger believed 
that the struggle for power in the international system ''may be contained if the _great powers are 
led by individuals who can contrive a 'legitimate' order, and work out between them some 
consensus on the limits within which the struggle should be controlled"). 
181. See Pearlstein, supra note 28; see also KISSINGER, supra note 152, at 32-36. 
182. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936). 
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Under the resolution, the President could choose when to impose the 
embargo and when to end it, and could make exceptions to its 
implementation, or set limits to its terms, without congressional approval. 183 
This resolution seemed like a non-starter under the courts' then-strict 
application of the non-delegation doctrine.184 But the Court, drawing a clear 
distinction between foreign and domestic affairs in constitutional law and 
advancing a controversial theory of extra-constitutional powers, approved 
the broad delegation of power to the President and offered a paean to the 
practical importance of an executive-centered constitutional foreign affairs 
framework. 185 
Curtiss-Wright has not fared well among scholars. Its broad 
pronouncements about foreign affairs and its theory of extra-constitutional 
powers have been repeatedly savaged.186 But Curtiss-Wright continues to be 
cited for the proposition that the President takes the lead role in foreign 
affairs, and it is still the most thorough explanation by a court for why this 
should be so. 187 Curtiss-Wright also makes clear the realist roots of the 
functionalist explanations for deference to the President by the courts. This 
subpart discusses the roots of Curtiss-Wright" s realism and its impact on the 
special deference doctrines. 
1. The Early Republic 
The Framers were aware of realist ideas. Alexander Hamilton, whom 
Fareed Zakaria called ''the realist father figure," drew a connection between 
the demands of the anarchic world and strong executive power.188 In the 
Federalist, he wrote that because "the circumstances that endanger the 
safety of nations are infinite, no constitutional shackles can wisely be 
183. Id. at 312. 
184. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign 
Relations, 85 VA. L. REv. 1 ( 1999). 
185. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329. 
186. See, e.g., KOH, supra note 37, at 94 (describing 'fowithering criticism" of Curtiss-
Wright); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 
1617, 1659 (1997) (referring to Curtiss-Wright as "the bete noire of U.S. foreign relations 
law''). 
187. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (describing Curtiss-
Wright's "historical gloss on the -executive Power"' of Article II, which confers on the 
President the "vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations" (quoting 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring))). 
188. FAREED ZAKARIA, FROM WEALTH TO POWER: THE UNUSUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICA'S 
ROLE IN THE WORLD 97, 181 ( 1998) [hereinafter ZAKARIA, WEALTH]. 
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imposed on the power to which the care of it is conrmitted."189 And the 
President is better suited than Congress for conducting the realpolitik 
necessary in foreign affairs: ''Decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch will 
generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent 
degree than the proceedings of any greater number."190 
However, the courts did not adopt or discuss such functionalist 
institutional competence assumptions. As Edward White explained in a 
seminal account, formalism dominated constitutional foreign affairs 
jurisprudence for most of the 19th Cen . Courts adhered to an 
"orthodox" separation of powers framework in foreign affairs, in which 
powers were distributed among the branches of the federal government "in 
accordance with a traditional, formal structure of constitutionally delegated 
and reserved powers."191 Under this orthodox framework, courts exercised 
their power to interpret foreign affairs statutes and treaties, cabining 
deference under the political question doctrine to a limited set of issues. 192 
These included declarations of war or peace, jurisdiction over foreign 
territory, the President's recognition of foreign governments, determination 
of territorial boundaries under treaties, and whether a foreign government 
had the power to ratify a treaty. 193 However, rather than abstaining from 
deciding the controversies altogether, the courts accepted the political 
branches' determinations as conclusive.194 Executive interpretations of 
treaties received little-to-no deference from courts, and were often 
rejected.195 
189. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 184-85 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
190. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see 
also Pearlstein, supra note 28 (discussing the use of Hamilton by advocates of strong executive 
power after 9/11). 
191. White, supra note 184, at 3. 
192. See id; Chesney, supra note 2, at 1 734 4 1 (describing courts' approach to treaty 
interpretation in the nineteenth century as consistent with Professor White's narrative). 
193. See, e.g., United States v. One Hundred and Twenty-Nine Packages, 27 F. Cas. 284, 
288 (E.D. Mo. 1862) (No. 15,941) ('"The judiciary, under the constitution, cannot declare war or 
make peace."); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign 
Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1401 n.15 [hereinafter Goldsmith, Formalism] 
(listing cases). 
194. See Goldsmith, Formalism, supra note 193, at 1400; White, supra note 184, at 27 
(''But even in those areas, nineteenth-century courts were willing to investigate facts and to 
ground their decisions on legal principles, sometimes invoking those principles in support of 
policies declared by Congress or the Executive."); see also Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 
212 (1890) (holding that international law justified legislation pertnitting the Executive to take 
possession of a "guano" island and that the question of who was sovereign on the island was a 
political one). 
195. David Sloss, Judicial D~ference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A 
Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 506-08 (2007) (surveying decisions 
interpreting treaties in the first fifty years of the Supreme Court and concluding that the Court 
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From a realist perspective, the formalist jurisprudence makes sense. At 
its birth, the United States was not yet a great power, though the others saw 
it as a potential threat.196 For the most part, early American foreign policy 
was isolationist, seeking to avoid entanglements with the European powers 
that had been warring for centuries. In fact, the separation of powers was 
designed, or at least served, to institutionalize America's diplomatic 
isolation.197 When the United States later became capable of engaging more 
fully with the rest of the world, this put increasing strain on the orthodox 
• 
regtme. 
2. A Great Power 
By the 1930s, the orthodox regime of constitutional foreign relations law 
had collapsed. Replacing it was doctrine recognizing a strong distinction 
between ·domestic and foreign realms of constitutional law, centralizing 
power in the Executive, and a discourse that emphasized superior executive 
competence in foreign affairs.198 Edward White has traced the subtle moves 
toward functionalism in constitutional interpretation in the early twentieth 
,cen that laid the groundwork for the new regime. 199 Gradually, legal 
scholars began to conceive of constitutional powers as functionalist rather 
than essentialist. This led naturally to a weighing of institutional 
competences in determining the allocation of powers among the branches of 
govertunent, rather than discerning limits that are already pre-ordained. 200. 
But the executive discretion aspect of Curtiss-Wright can be traced, not 
only to the rise of functionalism in constitutional interpretation, but the 
changing nature of the U.S. govermnent. During the ,early twentieth cen , 
did not defer at all to Executive interpretations). But see John Yoo, Rejoinder: Treaty 
Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL .. L. REv. 1305, 1310-11 (2002) 
(analyzing the Vesting Clause from an originalist perspective and concluding that the Framers 
intended a limited role for the judiciary in treaty interpretation). 
196. ROBERT KAGAN, DANGEROUS NATION 3 (2006) ("Most Americans today would be 
surprised to know that much of the world regarded America, even in its infancy, as a very 
dangerous nation."). 
197. KISSINGER, supra note 152, at 32-36; Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: 
Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671, 678-79 (1998). David 
Sloss has demonstrated, in a study of early Supreme Court cases and related materials, that the 
federal courts played an active role in implementing U.S. neutrality policy during the 1790s by 
providing a non-executive branch forum for the resolution of disputes involving privateers. See 
generally David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L .. J. 
145 (2008). 
198. White, supra note 184, at 2. 
199. See generally id. 
200. /d. at 47. 
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the Presidency steadily grew in power relative to other branches of 
government, along with the size of the federal bureaucracy and the scope of 
domestic federal regulation, culminating in the New Deal. As presidential 
power increased, foreign policy activism increased with it in mutually 
reinforcing ways.201 
The devastation of World War I and the unstable international situation 
following it provided the backdrop for Curtiss-Wright. 202 Totalitarian 
regimes in the Soviet Union, Japan, Gennany, and Italy seemed unlikely to 
abide by international law and increasingly sought their foreign policy goals 
through force or the threat of force. The 1930s saw the globe carved up by 
the great powers into closed, competing economic blocs a German sphere 
of influence, the Japan-dominated "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere," and a British imperial preferential system, among others that 
imperiled America's access to vital markets and raw materials in Europe 
and Asia.203 As one scholar has observed, the 1930s demonstrated that the 
United States could not "remain as a great industrial power within the 
confines of the Western hemisphere. "204 
The hostile world of the 1930s and '40s also provoked a crisis in the 
American foreign policy establishment and in the related community of 
international law scholars, who had, for most of the century, adhered to a 
decidedly non-realist, "classicist" approach to the world.205 Classicist 
statesmen and scholars in the early twentieth cen "hailed the creation of 
a new international legal order that could break out of what they believed 
was the discredited balance-of-power system. "206 They asserted that 
disputes among nations could be peacefully resolved through neutral, 
apolitical international institutions and principles, the recognition of shared 
mutual interests reflected in the law, and without resort to the use of 
force.207 The quintessential classicist document is the 1928 Kellogg-Briand 
Pact, a multilateral treaty outlawing war as an instrument of national policy 
201. ZAKARIA, WEALTH, supra note 188, at 10-11. 
202. See Chesney, supra note 2, at 1739; White, supra note 184, at 98. 
203. IKENBERRY, IMPERIAL, supra note 102, at 150-51. 
204. /d. at 151. 
205. See Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: The Twenty 
Years· Crisis, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 583, 584-602 (2004) [hereinafter Zasloff, Crisis] (describing 
classicism and its origins as part of a narrative about its influence on U.S. foreign policy from 
1921 to 1933, when "lawyers directed much of America's relations with the outside world"); 
see also Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded 
Age to the New Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 239, 247-57 (2003) (describing the origins and early 
influence of foreign policy classicism in more depth). 
206. Zasloff, Crisis, supra note 205, at 584. 
207. Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 64, 65-70 (2006). 
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but without any enforcement mechanism.208 The events of the 30s and the 
outbreak of World War II seemed to explode classicist principles.209 After 
the war, realism would replace classicism as the basis of U.S. foreign policy 
and dominate American international law scholarship through the Cold 
War.2Io 
3. The Realism of Curtiss-Wright 
Despite some formalist language, Curtiss-Wright is a realist and 
functionalist decision. It essentially draws on all three major realist tenets-
anarchy, unitary states, and realpolitik to create a new paradigm for 
courts' treatment of foreign affairs issues. The author of the majority 
opinion, Justice George Sutherland, had caused trouble for the New Deal as 
one of the "Four Horsemen" generally hostile to expansive federal power.211 
At the same time, Sutherland saw the need for the United States to respond 
effectively to the turtnoil of international events.212 The approach he took in 
Curtiss-Wright enabled him to preserve the domestic regime of limited and 
enumerated powers by distinguishing the foreign from the domestic while 
providing the executive branch with the discretion it needed to carry out 
foreign policy. 
Sutherland's opinion expressed the realist principle that foreign and 
domestic affairs are radically different because the outside world functions 
in a different way.213 In realism, there is a sharp distinction between the 
hierarchy that characterizes a state"s internal society and the anarchy that 
characterizes the international system. The Curtiss-Wright court drew the 
same distinction: unlike the domestic environment governed by separation 
of powers and federalism, the international system was a "vast external 
realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems."214 
208. Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of 
War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; see 
Zasloff, Crisis, supra note 205, at 629 (concluding that the Pact was a (,'completely useless 
paper instrument, greeted with extraordinary fanfare and delusions of grandeur''). 
209. For a revered realist study of the failures of classicism in the inter-war period, see 
CARR, supra note 152, at 63-94. 
210. Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 207, at 71. 
211. Michael Allan Wolf, George Sutherland, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 449, 449 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994). 
212. Sutherland delivered a version of his theory in a series of lectures at Columbia in 
1919, a month after the Armistice ending World War I. See White, supra note 184, at 57. 
213. See Gil Gott, A Tale of New Precedents: Japanese American Internment as Foreign 
Affairs Law, 40 B.C. L. REV. 179, 194-202 (1998) (discussing Curtiss-Wright as a realist 
decision); Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 2000 (same). 
214. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,319 (1936). 
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Curtiss-Wright's expansive view of executive power clashed with that same 
Court's enforcing strict limitations on federal power in particular, 
delegation of lawmaking to the executive branch in the domestic realm.215 
A second, and the most controversial, aspect of Curtiss-Wright reflected 
the realist assumption that states are the sole unitary actors in the 
international political arena. Drawing on his own earlier work, Sutherland 
asserted that very broad delegations of power to the Executive in foreign 
affairs did not offend constitutional separation-of-powers principles because 
the national government's foreign relations powers derived, at least in part, 
from extra-constitutional sources. For Sutherland, these "powers of external 
sovereignty" belong to all nations by virtue of their status as members "of 
the international family."216 The inherent powers were, therefore, transferred 
directly to the national govermnent of the United States from the British 
Crown upon independence. Because these powers never belonged to the 
States, they were not delegated to the federal government by the 
Constitution.217 In realist terms, then, these powers were "dictated by the 
autonomous logic of the international system."218 Sutherland's "inherent 
powers'' thesis does not fully explain, but certainly suggests, why the 
President, rather than Congress, should be given the lead role in foreign 
affairs. Unlike Congress, the President is a unitary actor, like the nation 
itself, with respect to the rest of the world. 
The third, and most important, innovation in Curtiss-Wright was both 
realist and functionalist it drew a direct connection between the 
requirements of the international realm and particular executive branch 
competences. Here again, the Court's reasoning sounded in international 
relations realism. Just as from a realist perspective the anarchic character of 
the world system requires balancing by the great powers and the exercise of 
realpolitik by statesmen, Curtiss-Wright paints a picture of the President, 
unfettered by domestic law or other branches of the govermnent, pursuing 
the interests of the United States in the arena with other great powers 
carefully balancing one another. Sutherland offered functional justifications 
for the President role as the "sole organ" in foreign affairs and why it would 
215. The Court considered Curtiss-Wright shortly after it had struck down three early-New 
Deal regulatory statutes, twice on non-delegation grounds. See, e~g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 
298 U.S. 238, 314-17 (1936) (Sutherland, J.) (invalidating a 1935 statute setting minimum 
. . 
prices and establishing collective bargaining in the coal industry); White, supra note 184, at 
100-01. 
216. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318. 
217. White, supra note 184, at 104-05. 
218. Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 2000. 
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be unwise for the Court to require Congress "to lay down narrowly definite 
standards by which the President is to be govemed."219 
Sutherland took founding-era functional justifications for vesting treaty 
negotiation power with the President and extrapolated them to the entire 
foreign affairs arena. 220 The President was in the position to "know[] the 
conditions which prevail in foreign countries" through "confidential sources 
of information" and "his agents in the fortn of diplomatic, consular, and 
other officials."221 Involving other branches in diplomacy could be 
"productive of hannful results" because secrecy would be harder to 
maintain. 222 One goal was to avoid embarrassment. 223 For support, 
Sutherland quoted from an 1816 Senate committee report concluding that 
the "nature of transactions with foreign nations . . . requires caution and 
unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and 
dispatch. "224 
Sutherland's opinion thus established the core set of functional 
justifications expertise, avoiding embarrassment, uniformity, flexibility, 
speed, and secrecy that are the pillars of special deference. 
4. Realism After Curtiss-Wright 
Curtiss-Wright provided the basis for increased deference across the 
spectrum of foreign affairs doctrines. As David Gray Adler put it, even 
when Curtiss-Wright's "sole organ" concept was "not invoked by name, its 
spirit, indeed its talismanic aura, has provided a common thread in a pattern 
of cases that has exalted presidential power above constitutional nonns."225 
The Curtiss-Wright revolution continued during the 1930s and 40s, as the 
international situation worsened and led to war. The Court recognized 
further expansions of executive power while further curtailing its own 
power by increasing deference. In United States v. Belmonf26 and United 
219. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319, 322. 
220. The "sole organ" language was taken, out of context, from a speech by John Marshall, 
then a Congressman. See Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and 
Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671, 690 (1998). 
221. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320. 
222. See id.; see also White, supra note 184, at 106. 
223. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320. 
224. !d. at 319. These were the same executive competences listed by Alexander Hamilton. 
See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
225. Adler, supra note 89, at 25; see also White, supra note 184, at 48 (describing Justice 
Sutherland as ua singularly influential force in the transfortnation of constitutional foreign 
relations jurisprudence"). 
226. 301 u.s. 324, 330-33 (1937). 
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States v. Pink,221 the Court held that the Roosevelt Administration's 
' 
agreement, through an exchange of letters, to -recognize the Soviet Union 
and seize Soviet assets in the U.S. without congressional approval or via 
the treaty-making process was supreme federal law, overruling 
inconsistent state law. The propriety of the agreement, Justice Douglas 
wrote in Pink, was a political question "not open to judicial inquiry. "228 In a 
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter famously de-clared that the nation "speaks 
with one voice" in foreign affairs.229 Belmont and Pink thus authorized an 
expansion of the President's power to make foreign affairs law, even 
affecting the private property of U.S. citizens, and near-total judicial 
deference to even very broad foreign policy means e.g., claim 
settlement in can'ying out his power to recognize foreign governments. 
World War II was the high-water mark for special deference.230 During 
this period, the executive branch used military commissions to try hundreds 
of thousands of cases, and the courts took an extremely deferential 
approach.231 In Ex Parte Quirin232 , the Court upheld the President's use of 
special military commissions to try eight Nazi saboteurs, including two U.S. 
citizens, arrested in the United States in 1942. The commissions were 
established by two short executive orders providing broad parameters for 
the trials without any implementing regulations.233 After the war, in 1946, 
the Court upheld the use of a commission to try a Japanese general for 
failing to prevent his troops in the Philippines from committing war 
crimes.234 In that case, In re Yamashita, the Court deferred to the President's 
determinations of military necessity.235 It declined to review the legality of 
using commissions away from the battlefield and after the end of active 
hostilities.236 Nor would the Court review the procedural rules used by the 
commission, and it deferred to the President's interpretation of the Geneva 
Conventions. 237 This extreme deferenc·e prompted passionate dissents from 
Justices Murphy and Rutledge, who argued that America's position of 
strength in the post-war world required the courts to play an independent 
227. 315 u.s. 203, 231 (1942). 
228. Id. at 223. 
229. Id. at 242 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
230. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006) (calling Ex parte Quirin the 
"high-water mark" for judicial deference); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I (1942). 
231. Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 207~8. 
232. 317 u.s. 1' 47--48 (1942). 
233 Id. at 32-35. 
234. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1946). 
235. Id. at 12-15. 
236. /d. 
237. /d. at 21-25. 
41 :0087] AMERICAN HEGEMONY 125 
role. Because the United States was working to create "a new era of law in 
the world," Rutledge insisted, it must adhere to its own "greatest traditions 
of administering justice."238 Japan, a defeated and occupied power, could 
not bargain with the U.S. to assert its rights because it no longer held U.S. 
prisoners.239 Rutledge concluded: "[C]ertainly, if there was the need of an 
independent neutral to protect her nationals during the war, there is more 
now [that the war had ended]. "240 
Justice Rutledge's plea for the courts to provide a check on executive 
power perhaps reflected the brief period of American global predominance 
in the late 1940s.241 But by 1950, the Soviet Union's blunt assertions of 
power and development of.nuclear weapons had made it clear that the world 
would be a bipolar one, and the U.S. once more needed to tend to the 
balance of power in Europe.242 That year, the Court again upheld the use of 
military commissions in Eisentrager.243 The Court would not examine the 
commission's procedural rules or the political branches' implementation of 
the Geneva Conventions. 244 And once more, the Court deferred to the 
executive branch's factual assessments of military necessity: citing Curtiss-
Wright, the Court rejected the petitioners' argument that commissions were 
unwarranted in view of the fact that there were no hostilities or martial law 
at the time the acts were committed. 245 
The Curtiss-Wright brand of special foreign affairs deference became 
firmly entrenched during the Cold War under a cloud of Soviet 
expansionism and the risk of nuclear conflict. What Joel Paul has called "a 
discourse of executive expediency" in U.S. politics influenced judicial 
discourse.246 The geopolitical situation seemed to require an increased 
ability for courts to shape their judgments to exec·utive needs, particularly 
during crises.247 During the 1960s, which were marked by high-tension 
238. /d. at 43 (Rutledge, J. dissenting). 
239. /d. at 78. 
240. /d. 
241. See IKENBERRY, IMPERIAL, supra note 102, at 25-26 ("Viewed in terms of material 
capabilities, the United States did occupy an overwhelmingly powerful position at the close of 
the War."). 
242. /d. at 30-31. 
243. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950). 
244. Id. at 789 n.l4. 
245. /d. at 789-90. 
246. Paul, supra note 197, at 671-72. 
247. Goldsmith, Formalism, supra note 193, 1408-09. The prominent exception to special 
deference during this period is, arguably, the Steel Seizure Case. See Youngstown v. Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 580 (1952) (declaring unlawful President Truman's extra-
legislative seizure of domestic steel mills during the Korean War). However, although 
Youngstown is often discussed as a foreign affairs case, Justice Jackson, in his celebrated 
concurrence, viewed the exercise of presidential power at issue as essentially domestic. See id. 
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events such as the 1961 Cuban Missile Crisis, the courts articulated stronger 
deference standards and evoked functional justifications for deference in 
foreign affairs. In a 1961 decision, Kolovrat v~ Oregon, the Supreme Court, 
for the first time, concluded that the executive branch's interpretations of 
treaties were entitled to "great weight. "248 Baker v. Carr, decided the 
following year, brought a revolution in the political question doctrine.249 
Rather than applying the classical, well-defined categories, courts would 
consider several factors, most of them functional considerations.250 And 
instead .of deferring on a particular issue in the case, courts would abstain 
from reviewing the government's actions altogether.25J The courts still 
abstain under the political question doctrine relatively frequently in foreign 
affairs cases .. 252 But courts have been all over the map, treating similar cases 
differently, resulting in ''jurisprudential chaos.''253 
The Supreme Court continued to deploy special deference through the 
end of the Cold War and beyond. In Dames & Moore, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion frankly acknowledged the irresolvable dilemma caused 
by the realist roots of special deference "the never-ending tension between 
the President exercising the executive authority in a world that presents 
each day some new challenge with which he must deal and the Constitution 
at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We should not use this occasion to circumscribe, much less to 
contract, the lawful role of the President as Commander-in-Chief. I should indulge the widest 
latitude of interpretation to sustain his exclusive function to command the instruments of 
national force, at least when turned against the outside world for security of our society. But, 
when it is turned inward, not because of rebellion but because of a lawful economic struggle 
between industry and labor, it should have no such indulgence."). Invoking the distinction 
between foreign and domestic realms enabled Jackson,-like Sutherland before him, to confirm 
the existence of very broad executive power in foreign affairs while enforcing limitations on 
executive power in the domestic context For a discussion of Youngstown as reinforcing the 
realist paradigm; see Gott, supra note 213, at 199-201. At the same time, Jackson's influential 
approach also enhanced the importance of functionalism in foreign affairs jurisprudence. See 
Stephen Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Functionalism in Youngstown's Shadow, 53 Sr. LOUIS U. L.l. 
29, 31 (2008) ("[I]n Youngstown's shadow, there is exceedingly little room for foreign affairs 
originalism in any fonn. "). 
248. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)~ In Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v~ 
Avagliano, the Court went further, suggesting that ambiguity was not a prerequisite for applying 
''great weight" deference in treaty interpretation. 457 U~S. 176, 184-85 (1982). 
249. 369 u.s. 186, 209-23 (1962). 
250. See id. 
251. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text; see also Goldsmith, Formalism, supra 
note 193, at 1402. 
252. See, e.g., Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 562 (3d Cir. 2006); Bancoult v. McNamara, 
445 F.3d 427, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 
2005); Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co.,-KG, 431 F.3d 57, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2005); lgartua-
De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2005). 
253. FRANCK, supra note l, at 8; see also Nzelibe, supra note 1,: at 941, 943; Goldsmith., 
Formalism, supra note 193, at 1399-1403. 
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under which we all live and which no one disputes embodies some sort of 
system of checks and balances."254 The requirements of realpolitik seem to 
be fundamentally at odds with the ordinary operation of the Constitution. 255 
The Second Circuit articulated this idea near the end of the Cold War: "[i]t 
is evident that in today's topsy-turvy world governments can topple and 
relationships can change in a moment. The Executive Branch must therefore 
have broad, unfettered discretion in matters involving such sensitive, fast-
changing, and complex foreign relationships. "256 
The courts largely accepted the idea that the anarchic nature of the world 
requires the President to do what is necessary to protect the nation's 
interests, including exercising authority that the law does not appear to 
grant him. But when the President asserts that lives are at risk if the Court 
fails to uphold executive branch policies, how can the courts preserve a 
place for separation-of-powers concerns in the balance? 
Ill. THE FUNCTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR SPECIAL DEFERENCE 
' 
This section explains the connection between the traditional functional 
justifications for special deference and particular aspects of international 
relations realism. These justifications engender a number of problems, 
many of which have already been addressed by other scholars.257 But the 
realist bases create problems of their own, on which I focus here. In 
particular, drawing a sharp distinction between domestic and foreign 
relations issues creates boundary problems: in today's interconnected world, 
domestic issues increasingly take on foreign affairs aspects. Moreover, 
using anarchy as a basis for deference seems to require total deference and 
does not, without more, explain the degree to which other separation-of-
powers purposes such as protecting individual rights and accountability-
should be balanced against the effectiveness demands of anarchy and 
realpolitik. 
254. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,662 (1981). 
25 5. Paul, supra note 197, at 7 63. 
256. Nat,'l Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 554-56 (2d Cir. 
1988) (relying on a U.S. government amicus brief requesting that Iran be allowed access to U.S. 
courts and permitting an Iranian lawsuit against a Liberian oil tanker to proceed, despite the fact 
that the U.S. did not recognize the government of Iran). 
25.7. See, e.g., Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 
116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1231-35 (2007); Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 946-47; see generally Jonathan 
I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805 (1989). · 
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A. Anarchy 
A common justification for deference is that the President possesses 
superior competence due to expertise, information gathering, and political 
savvy in foreign affairs. These conclusions flow from the realist tenet that 
the external context is fundamentally distinct from the domestic context. 
The domestic realm is hierarchical and legal; the outside world is anarchical 
and political. The international realm is thus far more complex and fluid 
than the domestic realm. The executive is a political branch, popularly-
elected and far more attuned to politics than are the courts.258 Judges are, for 
the most part, generalists who possess no special expertise in foreign 
affairs. 259 Courts can only receive the information presented to them and 
cannot look beyond the record. 260 The President has a vast foreign relations 
bureaucracy to obtain and process information from around the world. 
Executive agencies such as the State Department and the military better 
understand the nature of foreign countries their institutions and culture~­
and can predict responses in ways that courts cannot.261 
In the context of the political question doctrine, this rationale often 
appears when courts conclude that an issue lacks 'judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards."262 A stronger, related rationale is that the 
political branches are better suited for tracking dynamic and evolving nonns 
in the anarchic international environment. 263 The meaning of international 
law changes over time and nations do not agree today on its meaning. 
Moreover, the relationships among nations in many instances will be 
governed by informal nonns that do not correspond to intemationallaw.264 
In addition, many foreign affairs provisions in the Constitution had fixed 
meanings under international law in the Eighteenth Century what it 
meant, for example, to "declare war" or to issue "letters of marquee and 
258. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-
66 (1984) (stating that the Chief Executive is '~directly accountable to the people"). 
259. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979) 
(balancing the vital national interests of the United States and foreign countries is inappropriate 
because ''the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to evaluate the economic 
and social policies of a foreign country"). 
260. See Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 200-01. 
261. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1204 -05. 
262. Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Schneider v. Kissinger, 
412 F.3d 190, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
263. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 979. 
264. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1205, 1226. 
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reprisal" but subsequent practice has substantially altered their meaning or 
rendered them irrelevant. 265 Courts are not adept at tracking these shifts. 
As many critics have observed, the "lack of judicially-manageable 
standards" argument is weak. Courts create rules to govern disputes 
regarding vague constitutional provisions such as the Due Process Clause.266 
Furthermore, if courts were to adjudicate foreign affairs disputes more 
often, they would have the opportunity to create clearer standards, making 
them more manageable.267 Thus the lack-of-standards argument does not 
alone explain why foreign affairs should be off-limits. 
The argument regarding courts' limited access to information and lack of 
expertise seem persuasive at first, but it loses its force upon deeper 
inspection. For instance, expertise is also a rationale for Chevron deference 
in the domestic context.268 Generalist judges handle cases involving highly 
complex and obscure non-foreign affairs issues while giving appropriate 
deference to interpretations of agencies charged with administering 
statutory schemes. 269 What makes foreign affairs issues so different that 
they justify even greater deference?270 Perhaps foreign affairs issues are just 
an order of magnitude more complex than even the most complex domestic 
issues. However, this line of thinking very quickly leads to boundary 
problems. Economic globalization, rapid global information flow, and 
incre.ased transborder movement have "radically increased the number of 
cases that directly implicate foreign relations" and have made foreign 
parties and conduct, as well as international law questions, increasingly 
265. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 979; David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 13 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1791, 1859-60, 1860 n.209, 1874 (1998) (referring to the "now obsolete power 
to grant letters of marquee and reprisal"). 
266. See FRANCK, supra note 1, at 48-50; KoH, supra note 37, at 224; Nzelibe, supra note 
1, at 978-81; Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question'', 79 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 1031, 1046-48 ( 1985). 
267. Spiro, supra note 12, at 676-77 ("The argument that there are no applicable legal 
standards by which to determine a rule of decision is, first of all, alternatively circular or self-
fulfilling. The sorts of issues posed by foreign relations law are not as a matter of legal 
interpretation inherently different from other questions of law."). 
268. See Chevron U.S~A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 
(1984). 
269. See Charney, supra note 257, at 809 (observing that "[t]he role of the judiciary in 
[foreign affairs] cases does not differ from that played in other cases it routinely decides. The 
courts are provided with the necessary information by attorneys acting in their roles as 
advocates . In purely domestic cases, novel and highly complex technical issues are 
regularly and successfully addressed"); see also Spiro, supra note 12, at 678-79. 
270. See Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 663-67 (observing that domestic; and foreign 
relations matters are increasingly intertwined, undermining the expertise argument). 
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common in U.S. litigation.271 If courts were to cabin off all matters touching 
on foreign relations as beyond their expertise, it would result in an ever-
increasing abdication of their role. 
The political norm-tracking argument reveals the second major problem 
with using anarchy as a basis for special deference: it fails to account for the 
degree of deference that should be afforded to the President. Under the 
anarchy-based argument, the meaning of treaties and other concepts in 
foreign affairs depend entirely on politics and power dynamics, which the 
President is especially competent (and the courts especially incompetent) in 
tracking. If this is so, the courts must give total deference to the executive 
branch. If one does not wish to take the position that the courts should butt 
out altogether in foreign affairs, there must be other reasons for the courts' 
involvement. Even proponents of special deference generally acknowledge 
that some of the courts) strengths lie in protecting individual rights and 
"democracy-forcing."272 But what is the correct balance to strike between 
competing functional goals of the separation of powers? 
B. Unitary States 
Other functional justifications derive from the realist tenet that the world 
system is populated solely by unitary states. These arguments for special 
deference are the least persuasive. Most importantly, they do not correspond 
to actual practice. But they are, at bottom, another way of articulating the 
more compelling realpolitik arguments. 
1. Uniformity 
A common trope in the cases is that the nation "speaks with one voice" 
in foreign relations.273 With respect to the outside world, the United States is 
a singular, opaque entity. The one-voice phrase comes from Justice 
Frankfurter's concurrence in United States v. Pink, a decision containing 
sweeping language about the limits of the states' role in foreign relations.274 
271. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 257, at 1236; see also Goldsmith, Formalism, supra 
note 193, at 1397. 
272. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 1001; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between 
Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights 
During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 1, 1 (2004) (arguing that courts, by focusing 
on congressional endorsement of emergency measures, create "broad-based political 
accountability for the actions taken [by the executive] in the name of national security"). 
273. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
274. See id. at 242 ("In our dealings with the outside world, the United States speaks with 
one voice and acts as one ... . ");see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) 
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But the one-voice rationale has also been adopted in support of the 
executive-centered framework.275 
The one-voice rationale is in a sense not functionalist at all, but a formal 
essentialist assertion about the scope of the Constitution's allocation of 
powers. To the extent that it is functional, it must rest entirely on other 
rationales. A potential rationale is as follows: because the President is the 
only unitary, centralized branch of govenunent, 276 only the President can 
truly speak with one voice and is therefore the only branch that can suitably 
represent a unitary entity in the international arena. 
But as has been frequently observed, the United States has never strictly 
spoken "with one voice'' in foreign affairs. 277 The Constitution's text 
allocates foreign affairs powers to both the Congress and the President. 278 In 
practice, Congress has from time to time disagreed with the President, even 
regarding highly sensitive national security matters.279 And the courts have, 
from the very beginning, rejected executive branch interpretations of 
treaties.280 Although the separation of powers has been criticized as 
interfering with the ability of the United States to form a unified foreign 
policy, this is the government that the Constitution created.281 The one-voice 
argument simply does not hold up to scrutiny, at least in its strong form. But 
there are other rationales for a weaker form· embarrassment and 
accountability~ 
("[I]n respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of 
that government."); Spiro, supra note 12, at 681 ("It is the fact and features of the exogenous 
context that have dictated that the nation ·speak with one voice' when it comes to foreign 
relations ... and that that voice not be the judiciary~s."). 
275. Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2226 (2008) ("The Judiciary is not suited to second-
guess determinations . . . that would require federal courts to . . . undennine the Government's 
ability to speak with one voice in this area."). 
276. Although Congress and the courts are capable of speaking with one voice, only the 
President does so consistently. See, e.g., U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 
( 1936) ("[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the 
nation."). 
277. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the 'One Voice' Myth in U.S. Foreign 
Relations, 46 VILL. L. REv. 975, 975-76 (2001). 
278. Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 656. 
279. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 965-66 (discussing examples). 
280. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 787-93. 
281. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126, 128 (1980) 
(noting that a shortcoming of the constitutional structure of the United States is the inability to 
~'form a government"). 
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2. Embarrassment 
A related argument, and a justification for the one-voice rationale, is that 
the United States will be "embarrassed" by conflicting pronouncements 
from different branches of government. The risk of embarrassment plays a 
key role in the Curtiss-Wright homily on superior executive competence, 
and has been frequently mentioned in foreign affairs political question 
decisions since Baker v. Carr. 282 
The core of the embarrassment justification is, possibly, that U.S. 
diplomats will be undertnined in their delicate negotiations with other 
nations because court decisions that conflict with executive branch policy 
could baffle or even offend foreign officials.283 But it is difficult to argue 
that foreign dignitaries will fail to understand how the branches of the U.S. 
government can reach different interpretations of the law. America's current 
structure of government has existed for almost 230 years. In the past, "other 
nations [were] asked to understand our complex constitutional system of 
checks and balances and we somehow managed to survive as a nation. "284 
Other justifications that have been labeled as "embarrassment" are more 
compelling, however. Court proceedings could increase the risk of revealing 
sensitive information. Perhaps more importantly, judicial decisions could 
have unforeseen consequences that undermine U.S. interests, make the U.S. 
appear weak, and ultimately disrupt the delicate balance of power in 
international relations. This aspect is related to realpolitik, which I address 
in the next subpart. 
3. Accountability 
If nations are viewed as unitary entities in the international arena, there 
must be one governmental entity that can be held accountable for a nation 7 s 
actions in foreign affairs, and for the U.S., that can only be the executive 
branch. Through this executive-exclusive lens, the American public and 
foreign governments either do not know how to, or simply cannot, hold the 
282. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 189, 217 (1962); United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 ( 1936); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F .3d 1193, 1203, 
1207 (9th Cir. 2007); Gross v. Gertnan Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 378 (3d Cir. 
2006); lgartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2005); Wang v. 
Masaitis, 416 F .3d 992, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2005). 
283. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578,588 (1943) ("[C]ourts may not so exercise 
their jurisdiction ... as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign 
relations."); Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1318 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(concluding that judicial invalidation of the North American Free Trade Agreement would 
embarrass the President); see Spiro, supra note 12, at 678-82. 
284. Redish, supra note 266, at 1052. 
41:0087] AMERICAN HEGEMONY 133 
courts accountable for their foreign affairs decisions.285 Holding courts 
accountable is relatively difficult because the transaction costs are high. 286 
While the President is one officer elected every four years, the federal 
judiciary comprises hundreds of individuals possessing lifetime tenure, and 
who can only be formally held accountable through impeachment. 
Deferentialists also argue that the public associates the executive branch 
with national security and foreign affairs, but associates the courts with 
protecting minority rights and resolving controversies among domestic 
parties. 287 
The accountability justification generally overstates the degree to which 
courts are insulated from politics. 288 On the domestic front, Supreme Court 
appointments have become an increasingly prominent issue in presidential 
elections, at least since Roe v. Wade and the nominations of Robert Bork 
and Clarence Thomas.289 Although foreign affairs have not played much of 
a role in these debates thus far, this is almost certainly due to the courts' 
generally deferential approach to foreign relations controversies. When the 
courts have been bolder, SllCh as in the enemy combatant cases, they have 
c-aptured the attention of policy-makers and the public, creating issues for 
presidential campaigns.290 Moreover, accountability cuts both ways. It is a 
core purpose of the separation of powers.291 The courts can serve an 
important information-forcing role that assists the People in holding the 
executive branch accountable for foreign affairs decisions, many of which 
are shrouded in secrecy.292 Court cases require the government to clearly 
285. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at, 1213. 
286. See Jennifer Mason McAward, Congress's Power to Block Enforcement of Federal 
Court Orders, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1319, 1348-49 (2008). 
287. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 962. 
288. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257, 267-
69 (2005) (observing that scholars have recently ubegun to see that constitutional judging 
cannot be insulated from ~~ordinary, politics in quite the way theory demands"). 
289. See generally JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007); BENJAMIN 
WriTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES 6 (2006). 
290. Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain, at a town hall meeting in 
Pemberton, New Jersey, called the decision in Boumediene ~~one of the worst decisions in th.e 
history of this country." Swampland, http://www.time-
blog.com/swampland/2008/06/mccain _slams_ the_ supreme_ court.html (June 13, 2008, 11 :31 
EST). 
291. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
292. Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Constitution and Executive Competence in the Post-Cold 
War World, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 547, 572-73 (2007) (observing that independent 
assessments of intelligence faih~.res "strongly suggest that limiting cooperation, consultation, 
and engagement among agencies and between the branches can compromise, rather than 
enhance, security efforts in areas where intelligence collection and analysis are key"). 
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articulate the rationales for its policies and the procedures through which 
those policies were enacted. Habeas corpus forces federal officers to justify 
their detention of individuals whose imprisonment would otherwise remain 
unscrutinized. 293 
. . 
In any event, assuming that the courts are relatively less accountable than 
the politic.al branches, this aspect ·of the constitutional regime is accepted in 
the domestic context. Why should foreign affairs require faster and easier 
accountability? Ultimately, the one-voice arguments for special deference:-
for uniformity, accountability, and avoiding embarrassment must be 
grounded in assumptions about the peculiar requirements of managing a 
great power's foreign policy in an anarchic world. These are considerations 
of realpolitik, which I discuss in the next subpart. 
C. Realpolitik 
Among the most compelling functional arguments for special deference 
are normative considerations deriving from realpolitik. These arguments 
evoke common impressions about the conduct of foreign .Policy that it is 
conducted in secret; that it requires rapid responses to changing conditions, 
and that it involves delicate negotiations between a few elites representing 
the interests of the great powers who were willing to violate norms in order 
to achieve their foreign policy ends. These qualities are believed to be 
necessary to further the realist goals of' protecting the security of the state 
and maintaining a stable balance of power in a multipolar or bipolar 
international system. 294 
1. Flexibility 
Because the world is inherently anarchic and thus unstable, flexibility is 
crucial.. Because the meaning of international law c_hanges with subtly 
shifting power dynamics, the United States must be capable of quickly 
altering its interpretation of laws in order to preserve its advantage and 
avoid war if possible.295 Like Machiavelli's Prince,296 the U.S. government 
293. See John Connolly & Marc D. Falkoff, Habeas Corpus as Information-Forcing Device 
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors). 
294. See supra Part II.,A. 
295. See., e.g., Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 980 (''In the context of foreign affairs . ., an 
authoritative settlement of the law across time and institutions potentially results in the 
creation of a constitutional straight-Jacket binding the decision-making freedom of the political 
branches in the international arena.")~ 
296. See MACHIAVELLI~ supra note 177, at 59-60. 
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must be willing and able to bend with the shifting political winds and 
transgress norms ifnecessary.297 
On this terrain, the executive branch appears to have clear advantages 
over the courts. The executive branch is more capable of altering its 
interpretation of the law when it suits U.S. interests. The courts must work 
within the confines of doctrine and stare decisis. 298 Courts cannot weigh in 
on the vast majority of foreign affairs issues because they only hear the 
controversies that parties bring before them, and have only the power to 
adjudicate the issues raised. 299 In short, courts' status as legal, rather than 
political, institutions limits their flexibility. 
Again, however, the anarchy-based argument for flexibility boils down 
to an argument for total discretion. How do the courts determine when and 
how much to cabin executive power? Jide Nzelibe has concluded that in 
cases involving individual rights, the courts should take into account their 
competence in adjudicating such issues while balancing the individual 
rights concerns against the need to defer to the executive branch's foreign 
policy requirements.300 But if the courts lack competence to evaluate the 
importance of a foreign policy need, how can they competently weigh that 
need against the importance of protecting individual rights? 
2. Speed 
Since Curtiss-Wright, speed has been recognized as an important 
executive branch characteristic. The executive branch can reach a unifonn 
interpretation of the law quickly, and the courts are, by comparison, quite 
slow.301 This is understandable in a world in which subtly-shifting alliances 
detennine the balance of power. And in the age of terrorism, speed remains 
a crucial component of effective foreign policy. The ace card for defenders 
of special deference remains the national security emergency. How can we 
297. See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN 
EXECUTIVE POWER xix (1989) (offering an interpretation of the executive branch as a tamed 
version of Machiavelli's Prince, and concluding that the Constitution "would not work without 
a branch whose function could be accurately described . as getting around the constitution 
when necessary"). 
298. See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 220. 
299. /d. at 5 ("The courts consider only cases, cases require proper parties and proper 
issues, and foreign affairs do not ordinarily provide them to the courts' satisfaction."). 
300. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 946. 
301. See Ku & Yoo, Formalism, supra note 40, at 188 (arguing that the institutional 
structure of the federal judiciary ninety-four district courts and thirteen appellate courts-
inherently makes the judicial process slow). 
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possibly take the risk that the courts will hobble the President's efforts to 
protect the United States in a time of crisis?302 
It is important to separate the very slender category of true emergencies 
fro.m the vast category of foreign relations in general. The great majority of 
foreign affairs controversies do not involve the President sending troops 
abroad or· a threatened terrorist attack, and there is very little opportunity for 
courts to interfere with an executive· response to a crisis situation. Courts 
typically review the legality of presidential decisions years later.303 Most of 
the "enemy combatants" detained at Guantanamo were captured within a 
few months of September 11, 2001, and arrived at GuantRnamo in early 
2002.304 The Supreme Court did not address the detainees' constitutional 
right to habeas review until 2008 . 305 
The difficulty lies in situations where the courts are asked to use their 
equitable powers and issue injunctions or TROs before the issues have been 
fully adjudicated. Here it is the courts' institutional deliberativeness that is, 
arguably, the problem.306 
3. Secrecy 
Since Curtiss- Wright, secrecy has also been invoked as a rationale for 
deference to the executive in foreign affairs.307 Again, this evokes a 
multipolar world in which diplomacy is conducted in private by an elite 
cadre from the great powers. However, courts are capable of handling 
secrets even more skillfully than Congress.308 The secrecy argument is 
really an argument about the potential consequences of revealing secrets to 
non-governmental parties and the collateral consequences that would result. 
302. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 42, at 272 ('~To be able to respond to international 
crises, the President cannot be hemmed in by international treaties and Constitutional 
limitations, as interpreted by judges."); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
303. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 257, at 1256. 
304. JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 63-84 
(2006). 
305. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2229 (2008). 
306. See Ku & Yoo, Formalism, supra note 40, at 186-87. 
307. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 750 (1982) ("[T]he conduct of foreign affairs [is] 
a realm in which the Court has recognized that it would be intolerable that courts, without the 
relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on 
inforrnation properly held secret") (internal quotation marks omitte.d); United States v. Curtiss .. 
Wright Exp~ Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-21 (1936). 
308. See Pearlstein, supra note 28; Kenneth N .. Roth, After Guantanamo: The Case Against 
Preventive Detention, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 9, 16 (2008). 
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4. Collateral Consequences 
Many of the rationales for special deference ·expertise, embarrassment, 
unifonnity, and secrecy have, at their core, the assumption that the courts' 
involvement in foreign affairs will risk serious collateral consequences in 
international relations that courts cannot anticipate,. cannot fully understand, 
and do not have the power to adequately address. 309 There are collateral 
consequences for court decisions in the domestic context as well~ .But the 
distinction drawn in foreign affairs .reflects the tragic side of realism that 
the world is inherently an unstable and dangerous place, an arena for 
clashes between great powers under constant threat of war. In an 
international system in which the balance of power is precarious and 
preserved only through delicate maneuvering by statesmen, the courts' 
involvement could risk provoking another great power and undennining 
these efforts. 
But once again, this justification, taken to its logical conclusion, requires 
complete deference. If. courts truly lack any sense of the collateral 
consequences of their foreign affairs decisions, they cannot competently 
weigh those consequences against competing constitutional values. Suppose 
that the U .. S. government advances a novel interpretation of criminal 
statutes in order to prosecute a suspected terrorist whose release, the 
government insists, would create instability in a key U.S. ally in the Middle 
East. Under the collateral consequences justification, the court must always 
defer to the government's interpretation .. This would eviscerate entirely the 
courts' statutory interpretation role whenever there is a claimed foreign 
affairs exigency. 
5. Legitimacy 
Arguments for the courts' incompetence in foreign affairs also focus on 
legitimacy. Courts are said to lack legitimacy in this area because their 
ordinary power to bestow legitimacy on the other branches in the domestic 
context cannot function properly in the entirely political external realm. The 
political branches do not require the courts' blessing for their activities 
outside the U.S. 31° Furthermore, the courts seem to face a dilemma: If they 
contravene the executive branch, the public will view this involvement with 
309. See Crosby v. Nat' I Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, J86 (2000) (''We have,; after 
all, not only recognized the limits of our own capacity to ~determin[e] precisely when foreign 
nations will be offended by particular acts,' but consistently acknowledged that the 'nuances' of 
'the foreign policy of the United States ... are. much more the province of the Executive Branch 
and Congress than of this Court .... ")(internal citations omitted). 
31 0. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 952. 
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hostility, especially when national security is at stake.311 But if the courts 
side with the President, they risk being seen as mere cogs in the 
government's foreign policy apparatus.312 
However, some deferentialists acknowledge that courts should adjudicate 
foreign affairs cases involving individual rights claims but balance the right 
in question against the government's asserted foreign policy needs.313 The 
difficulty with this approach is that, under the anarchy/realpolitik 
worldview, the government's arguments must always tiump. If the courts 
are not competent to evaluate the importance of foreign policy necessity, 
then how can they weigh it against the value of individual rights? Similarly, 
if the courts lack legitimacy to evaluate foreign policy needs, their decisions 
will be perceived as lacking legitimacy whether individual rights are 
involved or not. Professors Ku and Y oo do not make a similar concession, 
at least with respect to non-citizens. They have concluded that, while the 
public may tolerate limited intervention to protect constitutional liberties in 
wartime, the public has no patience for the courts' interfering with 
executive prerogatives to reinforce the rights of aliens designated as 
enemies.314 B-ut in any event, the realist model seems to leave little room for 
the consideration of individual liberties, even for citizens. 
IV. THE HEGEMONIC MODEL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFERENCE 
Today's world is far different from the unstable, multipolar world of the 
1930s that provided the geopolitical context for Curtiss-Wright or the 
bipolar Cold War era in which the special deference doctrines were 
developed. This Section describes the post-Cold War international system 
and introduces the hegemonic model. It then discusses the enemy combatant 
cases as an application of that model. 
A. The American-Led International System 
Much of contemporary realist theory is concerned with the balance of 
power. Stability in an anarchic system is created by great powers, which 
form "poles" in the system. During the Cold War, the respective 
hegemonies of the Soviet Union and the United States maintained a balance 
311. See id. 
312. John C. Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-
Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 747, 768 (1997). 
313. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 952. 
314. See Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 186. 
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of power.315 But since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has 
lacked balancing rivals and is the only nation capable of projecting military 
power anywhere in the world. The United States today is frequently referred 
to as an empire by scholars from across the political spectrum.316 There is a 
vast literature on the United States as empire, but the aftermath of 9/11, the 
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the Bush Administration foreign policy 
.have spurred new interest in imperial theories.317 
Empire and imperialism are loaded terms, to say the least, and their use 
is just as often normative as descriptive.318 In a useful attempt to clear up 
confusion concerning definitions of empire,. Daniel A. Nexon and Thomas 
Wright have identified three frameworks for describing systems with 
preeminent powers: unipolarity, hegemony, and empire.319 Today's 
international system does not conform precisely to any of these three ideal-
typical structures, but they are useful for better aligning the institutional 
competences model with changes in the world. 
Unipolar orders have- few ties, with a single state dominating in an 
anarchical system. 320 These types of orders remain stable when the 
preeminent state cannot be challenged militarily because it has 
overwhelming_ capabilities or collective action problems prevent other 
nations from forming counter-balancing blocs.321 
American unipolarity has created a challenge for realists. Unipolarity 
was thought to be inherently unstable because other nations, seeking to 
protect their own security, form alliances to counter-balance the leading 
state.322 But no nation or group of nations has yet attempted to challenge 
America's military predominance.323 Although some realists predict that 
315. See Waltz, Reductionist, supra note 169, at 47~ 
316. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 253 (observing that scholars on both the left and 
right describe the U.S. as an empire); JosephS. Nye, Jr., U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq, 82 
FOREIGN AFF. 60, 60 (2005) (same). 
317. See, e~g., NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 
(2004); CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE END 
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2004). 
318. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 253. 
319. See id. at256-57. 
320. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE AND JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 24-25 
(1989). 
321. See William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, 24 INT'L SECURITY 5, 
5-6 (1999). 
322. See, e.g., IKENBERRY, IMPERIAL, supra note 102, at 104 (observing that, under 
traditional structural realist balance of power theory, "American preponderance is 
unsustainable" because ''it poses a danger to other states and balancing reactions are 
inevitable"); Waltz, Anarchic Orders, supra note 159, at 117. 
323. Craig, supra note 9, at 144~ 
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counter-balancing will occur or is already in some ways occurring,324 
William W ohlforth has offered a compelling explanation for why true 
counter-balancing; in the traditional realist sense, will probably not happen 
for decades.325 
American unipolarity is unprecedented. 326 First, the United States is 
geographically isolated from other potential rivals, who are located near one 
another in Eurasia.327 This mutes the security threat that the U.S. seems to 
pose while increasing the threats that potential rivals seem to pose to one 
another.328 Second, the U.S. far exceeds the capabilities of all other states in 
every aspect of power military, economic, technological, and in terms of 
what is known as "soft power.'' This advantage "is larger now than any 
analogous gap in the history of the modem state system. "329 Third, 
unipolarity is entrenched as the status quo for the first time since the 
seventeenth century, multiplying free rider problems for potential rivals and 
rendering less relevant all modem previous experience with balancing.330 
Finally, the potential rivals' possession of nuclear weapons makes the 
concentration of power in the United States appear less threatening. A war 
between great powers in today's world is very unlikely.311 
These factors make the current system much more stable, peaceful and 
durable than the past multi-polar and bipolar systems in which the United 
States operated for all of its history until 1991. The lack of balancing means 
that the United States, and by extension the executive branch, faces much 
weaker external constraints on its exercise of power than in the past.332 
Therefore, the internal processes of the U.S. matter now more than any 
other nations' have in history.333 And it is these internal processes, as much 
as external developments, that will determine the durability of American 
unipolarity. As one realist scholar has argued, the U.S. can best ensure the 
324. See, e.g., JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 392 (200 1) 
(arguing that regional hegemons will arise to challenge American dominance). 
325. Wohlfarth, supra note 321, at 8. 
326. !d. at 38. 
327. Potential rivals include China, Europe, Japan, and India. See F AREED ZAKARIA, THE 
POST-AMERICAN WORLD 21 (2008) (hereinafter ZAKARIA, AMERICAN]. 
328. Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlfarth, International Relations Theory and the 
Case Against Unilateralism, 3 PERSP. ON ·poL. 509, 511 (2005) [hereinafter Brooks & 
W ohlforth, Unilateral ism]. 
329. /d. 
330. /d. 
331. Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlfarth, Hard Times for So.ft Balancing, 30 INT'L 
SECURITY 72, 106 (2005) [hereinafter Brooks & Wohlfarth, Hard Times]. 
332. Abe be, supra note 12; Brooks & Wohlfarth, Hard Times, supra note 331, at 108 
("[O]ther states are simply not going to force the United States to act in a more restrained 
manner by acting in a systematic, co!'"ordinated manner to check U.S. power."). 
333. Wohlfarth, supra note 321, at 40. 
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stability of this unipolar order by ensuring that its predominance appears 
legitimate. 334 
Hegemonic orders take on hierarchical characteristics, with the 
preeminent power having denser political ties with other nations than in a 
unipolar order.335 Stability in hegemonic orders is maintained in part 
through security guarantees and trade relationships that result in economic 
specialization among nations.336 For example, if Nation X's security is 
supplied by Hegemon Y, Nation X can de-emphasize military power and 
focus on economic power. In a hegemonic system, the preeminent state has 
"the power to shape the rules of international politics according to its own 
interests."337 The hegemon, in return, provides public goods for the system 
as a whole. 338 The hegemon possesses not only superior command of 
military and economic resources but "soft" power, the ability to guide other 
states' preferences and interests.339 The durability and stability of 
hegemonic orders depends on other states' acceptance of the hegemon's 
role. The hegemon's leadership must be seen as legitimate. 340 
334. Stephen Walt, Keeping the World Off-Balance, in AMERICA UNRlVALED: THE FUTURE 
OF THE BALANCE OF POWER 121, 150 (G. John Ikenberry ed., 2002). 
335. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 253. 
336. G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE 
REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 10 (2001); Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 257. 
337. Michael Mastanduno, Hegemonic Order, 9/11, and the Bush Revolution, 5 INT'L REL. 
OF THE ASIA-PAC. 177, 179 (2005); see also Michael Mastanduno, Incomplete Hegemony and 
Security Order in the Asia-Pacific, in AMERICA UNRIVALED: THE FUTURE OF THE BALANCE OF 
POWER, supra note 334, at 187 ("The hegemonic state should be pivotal in setting the rules of 
the game, even if it does not prevail in every particular conflict."). For a classic study of 
hegemony, see ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(1987). 
338. Public goods are "nonrivalrous" capable of being simultaneously consumed by the 
provider and others and "nonexcludable" impossible to keep others from consuming. John 
0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REv. 
1175, I 236 (2007). 
339. Martin Griffiths, Beyond the Bush Doctrine: American Hegemony and World Order, 
23 AUSTRALASIAN J. AM. STUD. 63, 63 (2004). The term "soft power" was coined by Joseph 
Nye. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS x 
(2004) (explaining that soft power "is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather 
than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country.,s culture, political 
ideals, and policies."). 
340. Bruce Cumings, The United States: Hegemonic Still?, in THE INTERREGNUM: 
CONTROVERSIES IN WORLD POLITICS 1989-1999, at 285-86 (1999) ("[H]egemony is most 
effective when it is indirect, inclusive, plural, heterogeneous, and consensual less a fortn of 
domination than a form of legitimate global leadership."); Randall Schweller & David Priess, A 
Tale ofTu'o Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate, 41 MERSHON INT'L STUD. REV. 1, 24 
( 1997) f'~lf the hegemon adopts a benevolent strategy and creates a negotiated order based on 
legitimate influence and management, lesser states will bandwagon with rather than balance 
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The United States qualifies as a global hegemon. In many ways, the 
U~S. acts as a world govermnent.341 It provides public goods for the world, 
such as security guarantees, the protection of sea lanes, and support for 
open markets.342 After World War II, the U.S. forged a system of military 
alliances and transnational economic and political institutions such as the 
United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World 
Bank that remain in place today. The U,.S. provides security for allies such 
as Japan and Gennany by maintaining a strong military presence in Asia 
and Europe.343 Because of its overwhelming military might, the U.S. 
possesses what amounts to a "quasi-monopoly,; on the use of force.344 T.his 
prevents other nations from launching, wars that would tend to be truly 
destabilizing. Similarly, the United States provides a public good through 
its efforts to combat terrorism and confront even through regime 
change- rogue states. 345 
The United States also provides a public good through its promulgation 
and enforcement of international norms. It exercises a dominant influence 
on the definition of international law because it is the largest ''consumer" of 
such law and the only nation capable of enforcing it on a global scale. 346 
The U.S. was the primary driver behind the establishment of the United 
Nations system and the development of contemporary treaties and 
institutional regimes to effectuate those treaties in both public and private 
international law.,347 Moreover, controlling international norms are 
against it."). For the origins of this concept, see ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD 
POLITICS ( 1985). 
341. MANDELBAUM, supra note 10, at 164 (referring to "the American role as the-world's 
government"). 
342. See id. at 34-62 (describing the public goods provided by the United States for the 
world). 
343. ld. 
344 Ikenberry, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 618 ("The United States possesses a quasi-
monopoly on the international use of force while the domestic institutions and behaviors of 
states are increasingly open to global that is, American scrutiny.") 
345. See, e.g., MANDELBAUM, supra note 10, at 163 (observing that forceful U.S. measures 
to prevent rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons permitted .Europe and China to adopt 
more conciliatory postures toward those regimes); see also TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 144-61 (2004) (applying public goods theory to the control of rogue 
states). 
346. See McGinnis and Somin, supra note 338, at 1241~2. 
347. See Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1210, 
1227-29 (2005) (noting that "the, United States has historically been a major proponent and 
progenitor of international law norms'' and discussing U.S. influence over international 
economic law); Sarah Cleveland; Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 102 
(2006) (observing that "The United States was the ·primary instigator behind the establishment 
of the UN system and the creation of modem international treaties ranging from human rights 
and humanitarian law to international intellectual property and international trade.''). 
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sometimes embodied in the U.S. Constitution and domestic law rather than 
in treaties or customary international law. For example, whether terrorist 
threats will be countered effectively depends "in large part on U.S. law 
regarding armed conflict, from rules that define the circumstances under 
which the President can use force to those that define the proper treatment 
of enemy combatants. "348 
These public goods provided by the United States stabilize the system by 
legitimizing it and decreasing resistance to it. The transnational political and 
economic institutions created by the United States provide other countries 
with informal access to policymaking and tend to reduce resistance to 
American hegemony, encouraging others to "bandwagon" with the U.S. 
rather than seek to create alternative centers of power. 349 American 
hegemony also coincided with the rise of globalization the increasing 
integration and standardization of markets and cultures which tends to 
stabilize the global system and reduce conflict.350 
The legitimacy of American hegemony is strengthened and sustained by 
the democratic and accessible nature of the U.S. government. The American 
constitutional separation of powers is an international public good. The risk 
that it will hinder the ability of the U.S. to act swiftly, coherently or 
decisively in foreign affairs is counter-balanced by the benefits it provides 
in permitting foreigners multiple points of access to the govemment.351 
Foreign nations and citizens lobby Congress and executive branch agencies 
in the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Departments, where foreign 
policy is made. 352 They use the media to broadcast their point of view in an 
effort to influence the opinion of decision-makers.353 Because the United 
States is a nation of immigrants, many American citizens have a specific 
interest in the fates of particular countries and fortn ''ethnic lobbies" for the 
purpose of affecting foreign policy.354 The courts, too, are accessible to 
foreign nations and non-citizens. The Alien Tort Statute is emerging as an 
348. See McGinnis and Somin, supra note 338, at 1242. 
349. See, e.g., Ikenberry, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 613. 
350. See id. at 615-16. 
351. See MANDELBAUM, supra note 10, at 164-65. 
352. The post-Cold War era has seen an acceleration in the trend that began in the mid ... 
1970s, away from foreign policy conducted by an elite group within the executive branch 
toward one involving a much broader community. See John T. Tierney, Interest Group 
Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy, in CONGRESS RESURGENT 89, 95-98 
(Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay eds., 1993). 
353. See MANDELBAUM, supra note 10, at 165. 
. . 
354. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 338, at 1245. 
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important vehicle for adjudicating tort claims among non-citizens in U.S. 
courts.355 
Empires are more complex than unipolar or hegemonic systems. Empires 
consist of a "rimless-hub-and-spoke structure," with an imperial core the 
preeminent state ruling the periphery through intermediaries.356 The core 
institutionalizes its control through distinct, asymmetrical bargains 
(heterogeneous contracting) with each part of the periphery.357 Ties among 
peripheries (the spokes) are thin, creating firewalls against the spread of 
resistance to imperial rule from one part of the empire to the other.358 The 
success of imperial governance depends on the lack of a "rim."359 Stability 
in imperial orders is maintained through "divide and rule," preventing the 
formation of countervailing alliances in the periphery by exploiting 
differences among potential challengers. 360 Divide-and-rule strategies 
include using resources from one part of the empire against challengers in 
another part and multi-vocal communication legitimating imperial rule by 
signaling "different identities ... to different audiences. "361 
Although the U.S. has often been labeled an empire, the term applies 
only in limited respects and in certain situations. Many foreign relations 
scholars question the comparison.362 However, the U.S. does exercise 
informal imperial rule when it has routine and consistent influence over the 
foreign policies of other nations, who risk losing "crucial military, 
economic, or political support'' if they refuse to comply. 363 The "Status of 
Force Agreements" ("SOFAs") that govern legal rights and responsibilities 
of U.S. military personnel and others on U.S. bases throughout the world 
are typically one-sided.364 And the U.S. occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
had a strong imperial dynamic because those regimes depended on 
American support. 365 
355. See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 51 DUKE L.J. 
891, 954-55 (2008). 
356. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 258. 
357. See id. at 259; Charles Tilly, How Empires End, in AFTER EMPIRE: MULTIETHNIC 
SOCIETIES AND NATION-BUILDING 1, 3 (K. Barkey & M. von Hagen eds., 1997). 
358. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 261-62 .. 
359. /d. at 261-65. 
360. /d. at 261--62. 
361. /d. at 264. 
362. See, e.g., NYE, supra note 339, at 135-36. 
363. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 266. 
364. See Ryan M. Scoville, A Sociological Approach to the Negotiation of Military Base 
Agreements, 14 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. I, 6 (2006) (uWith great consistency, the 
United States has ... leveraged its international power to obtain base agreements that heavily 
favor U.S. interests over those of receiving states."). 
365. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 266-67. 
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But the management of empire is increasingly difficult in the era of 
globalization. Heterogeneous contracting and divide-and-rule strategies tend 
to fail when peripheries can comn1unicate with one another. The U.S. is less 
able control "the flow of information . . . about its bargains and activities 
around the world."366 In late 2008, negotiations on the Status of Force 
Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq were the subject of intense media 
scrutiny and became an issue in the presidential campaign. 367 Another 
classic imperial tactic the use of brutal, overwhelming force to eliminate 
resistance to imperial rule is also unlikely to be effective today. The 
success of counterinsurgency operations depends on winning a battle of 
ideas, and collateral damage is used by violent extremists, through the 
Internet and satellite media, to "create widespread sympathy for their 
cause."368 The abuses at Abu Ghraib, once public, harmed America's 
"brand'' and diminished support for U.S. policy abroad.369 Imperial rule, like 
hegemony, depends on maintaining legitimacy. 
B. Constructing a Hegemonic Model 
International relations scholars are still struggling to define the current 
era. The U.S.-led international order is unipolar, hegemonic, and, in some 
instances, imperial. In any event, this order diverges from traditional realist 
assumptions in important respects. It is unipolar, but stable. It is more 
hierarchical. The U.S. is not the same as other states; it performs unique 
functions in the world and has a government open and accessible to 
foreigners. And the stability and legitimacy of the system depends more on 
successful functioning of the U.S. govermnent as a whole than it does on 
balancing alliances crafted by elite statesmen practicing realpolitik. 
"[W]orld power politics are shaped primarily not by the structure created by 
interstate anarchy but by the foreign policy developed in Washington. "370 
These differences require a new model for assessing the institutional 
competences of the executive and judicial branches in foreign affairs. 
366. /d. at 268. 
367. See Charles Babington, Iraq Deal Hovers over Presidential Campaign, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 22, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2008-08-22-
3316922096 x.htm. 
-368. Colin H. Kahl, Coin of the Realm: Is There a Future for Counter-insurgency?, 86 
FOREIGN AFF. 169, 173 (2007) (discussing the 2007 U.S. Artny/Marine Corps Counter-
Insurgency Manual). 
369. See STEPHEN HOLMES, THE MATADOR'S CAPE: AMERICA'S RECKLESS RESPONSE TO 
TERROR 152-53 (2007). 
370. Craig, supra note 9, at 169. 
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One approach would be to adapt an institutional competence model using 
insights from a major alternative theory of international relations,-
liberalism. Liberal IR theory generally holds that internal characteristics of 
states in particular, the form of government dictate states' behavior, and 
that democracies do not go to war against one another.371 Liberalists also 
regard economic interdependence and international institutions as important 
for maintaining peace and stability in the world.372 Dean Anne-Marie 
Slaughter has proposed a binary model that distinguishes between liberal, 
democratic states and non-democratic states.373 Because domestic and 
foreign issues are "most convergent" among liberal democracies, Slaughter 
reasons, the courts should decide issues concerning the scope of the 
political branches' powers.374 With respect to non-liberal states, the position 
of the U.S. is more "realist," and courts should deploy a high level of 
deference. 375 
One strength of this binary approach is that it would tend to reduce the 
uncertainty in foreign affairs adjudication. Professor Nzelibe has observed 
that it would put courts in the difficult position of determining which 
countries are liberal democracies. 376 But even if courts are capable of 
making these determinations, they would still face the same dilemmas 
adjudicating controversies regarding non-liberal states. Where is the 
appropriate boundary between foreign affairs and domestic matters? How 
much discretion should be afforded the executive when individual rights 
and accountability values are at stake? 
To resolve these dilemmas, an institutional competence model should be 
applicable to foreign affairs adjudication across the board. In constructing a 
new realist model, it is worth recalling that the functional justifications for 
special deference are aimed at addressing problems of a particular sort of 
role effectiveness which allocation of power among the branches will best 
achieve general governmental effectiveness in foreign affairs. In the twenty-
first century, America's global role has changed, and the best means of 
achieving effectiveness in foreign affairs have changed as well. The 
international realm remains highly political if not as much as in the past-
but it is American politics that matters most. If the U.S. is truly an empire:-
371. See JOHN M. OWEN IV, LIBERAL PEACE, LIBERAL WAR: AMERICAN POLITICS AND 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 3-4 (1997); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign 
Affairs, in DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE 3, 10 (Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones & 
Steven E. Miller eds., 1996). 
372. See, e.g., EDWARD D. MANSFIELD, POWER, TRADE, AND WAR 122 (1994). 
373. Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 2002. 
374. !d. at 2002. 
375. /d. at 2002-03. 
376. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 974. 
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and in some respects it is the problems of imperial management will be 
far different from the problems of managing relations with one other great 
power or many great powers. Similarly, the management of hegemony or 
unipolarity requires a different set of competences. Although American 
predominance is recognized as a salient fact, there is no consensus _among 
realists about the precise nature of the current international order,377 The 
hegemonic model I offer here adopts common insights from the three IR 
frameworks unipolar, hegemonic, and imperial ·described above. 
First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of U.S. 
foreign affairs should be the preservation of American hegemony, which is 
more stable, more peaceful, and better for America's security and 
prosperity, than the alternatives. If the United States were to withdraw from. 
its global leadership role, no other nation would be capable of taking its 
place.378 The result would be radical instability and a greater risk of major 
war. 379 In addition, the United States would no longer benefit from the 
public goods it had formerly produc.ed; as the largest consumer, it would 
suffer the most. 
Second, the hegemonic model assumes that American hegemony is 
unusually stable and durable.3.80 As noted above, other nations have many 
incentives to continue to tolerate the current order.381 And although other 
nations or groups of nations China, the European Union, and India are 
often mentioned may eventually overtake the United States in certain 
areas, such as manufacturing, the U.S .. will remain dominant in most 
measures of capability for decades. According to 2007 estimates, the U.S. 
economy was projected to be twice the size of China's in 2025.382 The U.S. 
accounted for half of the world's military spending in 2007 and holds 
enormous advantages in defense technology that far outstrip would-be 
competitors.383 Predictions of American decline are not new, and they have 
thus far proved premature. 384 
3 77. See Craig, supra note 9, at 169. 
378. See JosephS. Nye, Jr., The American National Interest and Global Public Goods, 78 
INT'L AFF. 233, 239--40 (2002) ("If the largest beneficiary of a public good (for example, the 
United States) does not take the lead in directing disproportionate resources toward its 
provision, the smaller beneficiaries are unlikely to be able to produce it, because of the 
difficulties of organizing collective action when large numbers are involved."). 
379. See MANDELBAUM, supra note 10, at 98-99. 
380. See supra notes 349-350 and accompanying text. 
381. See supra notes 335-340 and accompanying text. 
382. ZAKARIA, AMERICAN, supra note 327, at 181. 
383. ld. at 181-82. 
384. ld. at 210-11. 
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Third, the hegemonic model assumes that preservation of American 
hegemony depends not just on power, but legitimacy.385 All three IR 
frameworks for describing predominant states although unipolarity less 
than hegemony or empire suggest that legitimacy is crucial to the stability 
and durability of the system. Although empires and predominant states in 
unipolar systems can conceivably maintain their position through the use of 
force, this is much more likely to exhaust the resources of the predominant 
state and to lead to counter-balancing or the loss of control. 386 Legitimacy as 
a method of maintaining predominance is far more efficient. 
The hegemonic model generally values courts' institutional competences 
more than the anarchic realist model. The courts' strengths in offering a 
stable interpretation of the law, relative insulation from political pressure, 
and power to bestow legitimacy are important for realizing the functional 
constitutional goal of effective U.S. foreign policy. This means that courts' 
treatment of deference in foreign affairs will, in most respects, resemble its 
treatment of domestic affairs. Given the amorphous quality of foreign 
affairs deference, this "domestication" reduces uncertainty. The increasing 
boundary problems caused by the proliferation of treaties and the 
infiltration of domestic law by foreign affairs issues are lessened by 
reducing the deference gap. And the dilemma caused by the need to weigh 
different functional considerations liberty, accountability, and 
effectiveness against one another is made less intractable because it 
becomes part of the same project that the courts constantly grapple with in 
adjudicating domestic disputes. 
The domestic deference doctrines such as Chevron and Skidmore are 
hardly models of clarity, but they are applied and discussed by the courts 
much more often than foreign affairs deference doctrines, and can be 
usefully applied to foreign affairs cases as well. 387 The domestic deference 
doctrines are a recognition that legal interpretation often depends on 
politics, just as it does in the international realm. 388 Most of the same 
functional rationales expertise, accountability, flexibility, and 
uniformity that are advanced in support of exceptional foreign affairs 
deference also undergird Chevron. Accordingly, Chevron deference 
provides considerable latitude for the executive branch to change its 
interpretation of the law to adjust to foreign policy requirements. Once 
courts detertnine that a statute is ambiguous, the reasonableness threshold is 
385. See supra notes 349-50 and accompanying text. 
386. Recall that globalization is likely to thwart traditional methods of "divide-and-ruleh in 
imperial structures. See Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 262, 268. 
387. See generally Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 653; Sullivan, supra note I. 
388. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1204-05. 
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easy for the agency to meet; that is why Chevron is "strong medicine.''389 At 
the same time, Chevron's limited application ensures that agency 
interpretations result from a full and fair process. Without such process, the 
courts should look skeptically on altered interpretations of the law. 
Returning to domestic ·deferenc.e standards as a baseline clarifies the 
ways in which foreign affairs are truly "special." The best response to the 
special nature of foreign affairs matters does not lie simply in adopting 
domestic deference on steroids. Instead, accurate analysis must also take 
into account the ways in which the constitutional separation of powers 
already .accommodates the uniqueness of foreign affairs. Many of the 
differences between domestic and foreign affairs play out not in legal 
doctrine; but in the relationship between the President and Congress. Under 
the hegemonic model, courts would still wind up deferring to executive 
branch interpretations much more often in foreign affairs matters because 
Congress is more likely to delegate law-making to the executive branch in 
those areas. 390 
Nonetheless, foreign relations remain special, and courts must treat them 
differently in one important respect. In the twenty-first cen , speed 
matters, and the executive branch alone possesses the ability to articulate 
and implement foreign policy quickly. Even non-realists will acknowledge 
that the international realm is much more susceptible to crisis and 
emergency than the domestic realm. But speed remains more important 
even to non-crisis foreign affairs cases. 391 It is true that the stable nature of 
American hegemony will prevent truly destabilizing events from happening 
without great changes in the geopolitical situation the sort that occur over 
decades. The United States will not, for some time, face the same sorts of 
existential threats as in the past.392 Nonetheless, in foreign affairs matters, it 
is only the executive branch that has the capacity successfully to conduct 
389. Thomas Merrill & Kristin Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 859 ("The 
Chevron decision requires courts to accept any agency interpretation that is reasonable, even if 
it is not the interpretation that the court finds most plausible."). 
390. Examples include the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1701-06 (2006), and the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-5 (1994). 
See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-39 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (offering an influential framework in which the President's powers in foreign 
affairs are highest when supported by congressional approval). 
391. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1204. 
392. See Fareed Zakaria, True or False: We Need a Wartime President, NEWSWEEK, July 
14, 2008, at 48 (rejecting arguments that al Qaeda or Iran represent existential threats to the 
United States). But see PHILIP BOBBIT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 202 (2006) ('41An existential threat is precisely the sort of threat that terror 
") poses. . 
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treaty negotiations, for example, which depend on adjusting positions 
quickly. 
The need for speed is particularly acute in crises. Threats from 
transnational terrorist groups and loose nuclear weapons are among the 
most serious problems facing the United States today. The United States 
maintains a "quasi-monopoly on the international use of force,"393 but the 
rapid pace of change and improvements in weapons technology mean that 
the executive branch must respond to emergencies long before the courts 
have an opportunity to weigh in. Even if a court was able to respond quickly 
enough, it is not clear that we would want courts to adjudicate foreign 
affairs crises without the deliberation and opportunities for review that are 
essential aspects of their institutional competence. Therefore, courts should 
grant a higher level of deference to executive branch determinations in 
deciding whether to grant a temporary restraining order or a preliminary 
injunction in foreign affairs matters. Under the super-strong Curtiss~ Wright 
deference scheme, the court should accept the executive branch 
interpretation unless Congress has specifically addressed the matter and the 
issue does not fall within the President's textually-specified Article I 
powers. 
But there are limits. Although speed matters a ,great deal during crises, its 
importance diminishes over time and other institutional competences 
asst1me greater importance. When decisions made in response to 
emergencies are cemented into policy over the course of years, the courts' 
institutional capabilities information-forcing and stabilizing 
characteristics serve an important role in evaluating those policies.394 
Once a sufficient amount of time has passed, the amount of-deference given 
to executive branch determinations should be reduced so that it matches 
domestic deference standards. 
One of the core realist arguments for deference, the risk of collateral 
consequences, carries far less weight under a hegemonic model. Court 
decisions have consequences for third parties in the domestic realm all of 
the time, Given the hierarchical nature of U.S. hegemony, the response from 
other nations is likely to be more similar to the response by domestic parties 
than in the past. A typical example invoked by deferentialists involves a 
court decision for example; recognizing the government of Taiwan that 
angers the Chinese government. 395 Although such a scenario is not out of 
the question, there are several reasons why the consequences would not be 
as dire as often predicted by deferentialists. American military dominance 
393. Ikenberry, Liberalism,-supra note 6, at 618. 
394. Pearlstein, supra note. 28, at 61. 
395. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1213 n.145. 
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makes it highly unlikely that war would result from such an incident.396 
Moreover, China, too, cares about legitimacy and is far more likely to 
retaliate in some other way, possibly harming the United States' interests, 
but through means that would capture attention in the U.S. domestic realm, 
leading to accountability .opportunities. Assuming that the decision is non-
constitutional, the Chinese government could seek to have its preferred 
interpretation enacted into law. 
Indeed, it is entirely possible that other nations would be content with 
conflicting decisions from different branches of the U.S. government. 
Suppose that the President roundly condemns the offensive court decision 
and declares the judge to be an ~'activist." If the damage done by the court 
decision was largely dignitary, an angry denouncement from the executive 
branch may be all that is needed. Past empires relied on multi-vocal 
signaling to maintain imperial rule.397 But with the advent of globalization, 
intra-executive branch multi-vocality is much more difficult because 
advances in communication permit various parts of the "rim" to 
communicate with one another.398 The American separation-of-powers 
system provides a way around this problem, allowing the U.S. government 
to "speak in different voices" at once. 
C. Applying the Hegemonic Model: The Enemy Combatant Cases 
In the wake of 9/11, the United States invaded Afghanistan and toppled 
the Taliban government.399 Thousands of men; most captured by our allies 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan (but also many other places around the world), 
were transferred to U.S. custody and detained in a network of prisons 
stretching from Afghanistan to Eastern Europe to Asia to Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.400 The President made an executive determination that all detainees 
held at Guantanamo were "enemy combatants," and that the law of armed 
conflict specifically, the Geneva Conventions did not apply to them.401 
J96. See Wang Jisi, China's Search for Stability with America, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 39, 39-40 
(2005) (noting that "for the next several years, Washington will not regard Beijing as its main 
security threat, and China will avoid antagonizing the United States''). 
397. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 264. 
398. See supra notes 366-69 and accompanying text. 
399. See MARGULIES, supra note 304, at 3. 
400. See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. PosT, 
Nov. 2, 2005, at At. 
401. See Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J. 
Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, 
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, Jan. 9, 2002, reprinted in 
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 71 (Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel eds., 
2005) (concluding that the Geneva Convetions did not apply to the conflict with the Taliban and 
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The detainees were deliberately held in places where they were thought to 
have no rights under the U.S. Constitution or any other domestic law.402 In 
2003, the United States invaded Iraq, disrupting relationships with allies 
and leading to a decline in support around the world for U.S. foreign 
policy.403 Theories of American Empire became a hot topic of discussion in 
the time leading up to, and following, the Iraq invasion.404 Meanwhile, the 
Guantanamo detainees began to file habeas claims and the litigation wound 
its way up to the Supreme Court. 405 The Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal 
broke in May 2004,406 a month before the Court decided Rasu/,401 which was 
the first enemy combatant case and appeared to herald a shift in the Court's 
approach to special deference. 
The Court may be finally adjusting to the reality of American power. 
The U.S. has been a global hegemon since 1991 and has used military 
means to enforce international law norms: for example, the U.S.-led 
bombing of Serbia in 1998 halted ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.408 But the 
scope and impact of America7 s projection of power since 9/11 has 
underscored the significance of its unique status. The classic realist view of 
the world with great powers ac.hieving a consensus that preserves a 
precarious balance of power no longer fits.409 Accordingly, the 
institutional competences most valued for achieving governmental 
effectiveness in foreign affairs in the classic realist world (with the 
exception of speed) have become less important, and other competences 
have become more important. 
Al-Qaeda); Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, et al., Humane 
Treatment of al Qaeda and Tali ban Detainees, Feb. 7, 2002, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: 
THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 134 (Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel eds., 2005) (detennining 
that all detainees held at Guantanamo are , .. unlawful enemy combatants"). 
402. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Y oo, Deputy Assistant Attorneys 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, 
U.S. Dep't of Def. 6-8 (Dec. 28, 2001) (regarding possible habeas jurisdiction over aliens held 
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), available at 
http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/01.12.28.pdf. 
403. See Holmes, supra note 369, at 68, 82-91. 
404. See, e.g., NYE, supra note 339, at 25. 
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407 See id. 
408. See Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1683, 1690 (2000) (arguing that "[m]ilitary action to aid the Kosovar Albanians was the 
right thing to do''); Ruth S. Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 
828, 828 (1999) (noting that NATO's action in Kosovo "may also mark the emergence of a 
limited and conditional right of humanitarian intervention" in international law). 
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Nonetheless, since 9/11, deferentialists have argued that the classic 
realist justifications for special deference apply with even more force to the 
war on terror.410 This is the constitutional equivalent of a problem that has 
hobbled U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century the persistence of 
Cold War paradigms in strategic thinking. Administration officials, in the 
early days after 9/11, tended to lump together terrorist groups such as al 
Qaeda and rogue states such as Iraq into one common existential enemy to 
occupy the position of the former Soviet Union.411 The threat posed ·by al 
Qaeda is different because it cannot hope to remove the U.S. from its 
position as global hegemon only another great power could do that. 
Instead, the terrorist threat presents a challenge of hegemonic management 
that can only be met by the combined effort of all branches of the U.S. 
government. In the enemy combatant .cases, the Court seems to have 
recognized this shift and asserted its authority. But whether or not the 
enemy combatant cases were decided with these sorts of broad geopolitical 
concerns in mind, the changed hegemonic order justifies the jurisprudence. 
The Bush Administration's detainee policy made clear that due to 
America's power the content of enforceable international law applicable 
to the detainees would largely depend on interpretation by the U.S. 
government. Under the classic realist paradigm, international law is less 
susceptible to judicial comprehension. because it cannot be taken at face 
value; its actual, enforceable meaning depends on ever-shifting political 
dynamics and complex relationships among great powers. But in a 
hegemonic system, while enforceable international legal norms may still be 
political, their content is heavily influenced by the politics of one nation-
the United States.412 As an institution of that same government, the courts 
are well-positioned to understand and interpret international law that has 
been incorporated into U.S. law. Because the courts have the capacity to 
track international legal nortns, there was no longer a justification for 
exceptional deference to the Administration's interpretation of the Geneva 
Conventions as applied to the detainees. 
Professors Posner and Sunstein have argued for exceptional deference on 
the ground that, unless the executive is the voice of the nation in foreign 
affairs, other nations will not know whom to hold accountable for foreign 
policy decisions.413 But the Guantanamo litigation demonstrated that 
American hegemony has altered this classic assumption as well. The 
410. See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 186. 
411 .. See HOLMES, supra note 369, at 153. 
412.. See Craig, supra note 9, at 168. 
413. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1199; supra notes 285-87 and accompanying 
text. 
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transparent and accessible nature of the U.S. govenunent made it possible 
for other nations to be informed about the detainee policy and, conceivably, 
to have a role in changing it. The Kuwaiti government hired American 
attorneys to represent their citizens held at Guantanamo.414 In the enemy 
combatant litigation, the govenunent was forced to better articulate its 
detainee policies, justify the detention of each detainee, and permit attorney 
visits with the detainees.415 Other nations learned about the treatment of 
their citizens through the information obtained by attomeys.416 
Although the political climate in the U.S. did not enable other nations to 
have an effect on detainee policy directly and Congress, in fact, acted 
twice to limit detainees' access to the courts417 this was an exceptional 
situation. Foreign governments routinely lobby Congress for favorable 
foreign affairs legislation, and are more successful with less politically-
charged issues.418 Even "rogue states'·' such as Myanmar have their lobbyists 
in Washington.419 In addition, foreign governments facing unfavorable court 
decisions can and do appeal or seek reversal through political channels.420 
The accessibility and openness of the U.S. government is not a scandal or 
weakness; instead, it strengthens American hegemony by giving other 
nations a voice in policy, drawing them into deeper relations.hips that serve 
America's strategic interests.421 In the Guantanamo litigation, the courts 
served as an important accountability mechanism when the political 
branches were relatively unaccountable to the interests of other nations. 
The hegemonic model also reduces the n.eed for executive branch 
flexibility, and the institutional competence terrain shifts toward the courts. 
The stability of the current U.S.-led international system depends on the 
ability of the U.S. to govern effectively. Effective governance depends on, 
among other things, predictability.422 G. John Ikenberry analogizes 
America's hegemonic position to that of a "giant corporation'' seeking 
foreign investors: "The rule of law and the institutions of policy making in a 
democracy are the political equivalent of corporate transparency and 
414. Neil Macfarquhar, Kuwaitis Press U.S. Over 12 Held at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2002, at Al8. 
415. WITTES, supra note 289, at 17. 
416. Carol D. Leonnig, Further Detainee Abuse Alleged, WASH. PosT, Dec. 26, 2004, at 
Al. 
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CONGRESS RESURGENT, supra note 352, at 95-97. 
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420. Spiro, supra note 12, at 649. 
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422. G. John Ikenberry, American Unipolarity: The Sources of Persistence and Decline, in 
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accountability."423 Stable interpretation of the law bolsters the stability of 
the system because other nations will know that they can rely on those 
interpretations and that there will be at least some degree of enforcement by 
the United States. At the same time, the separation of powers serves the 
global-governance function by reducing the ability of the executive branch 
to make "abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states. '~24 
The Bush Administration's detainee policy, for all of its virtues and 
faults, was an exceedingly aggressive departure from existing norms, and 
was therefore bound to generate intense controversy. It was formulated 
quickly, by a small group of policy-makers and legal advisors without 
consulting Congress and over the objections of even some within the 
executive branch.425 Although the Administration invoked the law of armed 
conflict to justify its detention of enemy combatants, it did not seem to 
recognize limits imposed by that law.426 Most significantly, it designed the 
detention scheme around interrogation rather than incapacitation and 
excluded the detainees from all legal protections of the Geneva 
Conventions.427 It declared all detainees at Guantanamo to be "enemy 
combatants" without establishing a regularized process for making an 
individual determination for each detainee.428 And when it established the 
military commissions, also without consulting Congress, the Administration 
denied defendants important procedural protections.429 
In an anarchic world characterized by great power conflict, one could 
make the argument that the executive branch requires maximum flexibility 
to defeat the enemy, who may not adhere to international law. Indeed, the 
precedents relied on most heavily by the Administration in the enemy 
combatant cases date from the 1930s and 1940s a period when the 
international system was radically unstable, and the United States was one 
of several great powers vying for advantage.430 But during that time, the 
executive branch faced much more exogenous pressure from other great 
powers to comply with international law in the treatment of captured 
enemies. If the United States strayed too far from established norms, it 
would risk retaliation upon its own soldiers or other consequences from 
423. /d. at 294. 
424. /d. at 292. 
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powerful rivals. Today, there are no such constraints: enemies such as al 
Qaeda are not great powers and are not likely to obey international law 
anyway. Instead, the danger is that American rule-breaking will set a pattern 
of rule-breaking for the world, leading to instability.431 America)s military 
predominance enables it to set the rules of the game. When the U.S. breaks 
its own rules, it loses legitimacy. 
The Supreme Court's response to the detainee policy enabled the U.S. 
government as a whole to hew more closely to established procedures and 
norms, and to regularize the process for departing from them. After 
Hamdi,432 the Department of Defense established a process, the CSRTs, for 
making an individual determination about the enemy combatant status of all 
detainees at Guantanamo. After the Court recognized habeas jurisdiction at 
Guantanamo, Congress passed the DT A, 433 establishing direct judicial 
review of CSR T determinations in lieu of habeas. Similarly, after the Court 
declared the military commissions unlawful in Hamdan,434 this forced the 
Administration to seek congressional approval for commissions that 
restored some of the rights afforded at courts martial.435 In Boumediene, the 
Court rejected the executive branch's foreign policy arguments, and bucked 
Congress as well, to restore the norm of habeas review.436 
Throughout this enemy combatant litigation, it has been the courts' 
relative insulation from politics that has enabled them to take the long view. 
In contrast, the President's (and Congress's) responsiveness to political 
concerns in the wake of 9/11 has encouraged them to depart from 
established norms for the nation's perceived short-term advantage, even at 
the expense of the nation's long-term interests.437 As Derek Jinks and Neal 
Katyal have observed, "[t]reaties are part of [a] system of time-tested 
standards, and this feature makes the wisdom of their judicial interpretation 
manifest. "438 
At the same time, the enemy combatant cases make allowances for the 
executive branch's superior speed. The care that the Court took to limit the 
issues it decided in each case gave the executive branch plenty of time to 
431. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 257, at 1245 (noting that other nations have justified 
the abuse of prisoners because of U.S. practices). 
432. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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arrive at an effective detainee policy.439 Hamdi, Rasul, and Boumediene 
recognized that the availability of habeas would depend on the distance 
from the battlefield and the length of detention. 440 
The enemy combatant litigation also underscores the extent to which the 
classic realist assumptions about courts' legitimacy in foreign affairs have 
been turned on their head. In an anarchic world, legitimacy derives largely 
from brute force. The courts have no armies at their disposal and look weak 
when they issue decisions that cannot be enforced.441 But in a hegemonic 
system, where governance depends on voluntary acquiescence, the courts 
have a greater role to play. Rather than hobbling the exercise of foreign 
policy, the courts are a key form of "soft power."442 As Justice Kennedy's 
majority opinion observed in Boumediene, courts can bestow external 
legitimacy on the acts of the political branches.443 Acts having a basis in law 
are almost universally regarded as more legitimate than merely political 
acts. Most foreign policy experts believe that the Bush Administration's 
detention scheme ''hurt America's image and standing in the world. "444 The 
restoration of habeas corpus in Boumediene may help begin to counteract 
this loss of prestige. 
Finally, the enemy combatant cases are striking in that they embrace a 
role for representation-reinforcement in the international realm.445 Although 
defenders of special deference acknowledge that courts' strengths lie in 
protecting the rights of minorities, it has been very difficult for courts to 
protect these rights in the face of exigencies asserted by the executive 
branch in foreign affairs matters. This is especially difficult when the 
minorities are alleged enemy aliens being held outside the sovereign 
territory of the United States in wartime. In the infamous Korematsu 
decision, another World War II-era case, the Court bowed to the President's 
factual assessment of the emergency justifying detention ofU.S. citizens of 
Japanese ancestry living in the United States.446 In Boumediene, the Court 
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pointedly declined to defer to the executive branch's factual assessments of 
military necessity.447 The court may have recognized that a more aggressive 
role in protecting the rights of non-citizens was required by American 
hegemony. In fact, the arguments for deference with respect to the rights of 
non-citizens are even weaker because aliens lack a political constituency in 
the United States.448 This outward-looking fonn of representation-
reinforcement serves important functions. It strengthens the legitimacy of 
U.S. hegemony by establishing equality as a benchmark and reinforces the 
sense that our constitutional values reflect universal human rights.449 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to the constitutional regime of foreign affairs, geopolitics 
has always mattered. Understandings about America's role in the world 
have shaped foreign affairs doctrines. But the classic realist assumptions 
that support special deference do not reflect the world as it is today. A 
better, more realist, approach looks to the ways that the courts can reinforce 
and legitimize America's leadership role. The Supreme Court's rejection of 
the government's claimed exigencies in the enemy combatant cases strongly 
indicates that the Judiciary is becoming reconciled to the current world 
order and is asserting its prerogatives in response to the fewer constraints 
imposed on the executive branch. In other words, the courts are moving 
toward the hegemonic model. In the great dismal swamp that is the judicial 
treatment of foreign affairs, this transformation offers hope for clarity: the 
positive reality of the international system, despite terrorism and other 
serious challenges, permits the courts to reduce the "deference gap" 
between foreign and domestic cases. 
447. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2261 (2008). 
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